Convergence in Global Manufacturing Compensation Costs: An International  Trade Perspective/ by Morris, Emily Kolinski
CONVERGENCE IN GLOBAL MANUFACTURING COMPENSATION COSTS: 









A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
(Economics) 





















Professor Alan V. Deardorff, Chair 
Assistant Professor Yoonseok Lee 
Assistant Professor Jagadeesh Sivadasan 







































I have been fortunate to benefit from the wisdom and support of so many 
exceptional individuals over the course of this undertaking, and throughout my academic 
and professional career so far.  I hope that they will accept these brief acknowledgements 
as a token of my much greater thanks for their contributions. 
I would like to thank the members of my committee, each of whom brought a 
unique perspective to this project.  Professor Deardorff, as your festschrift reminds us all 
of your contributions in the field of international trade, I am privileged that you were 
willing to serve as my adviser.  I have truly enjoyed our conversations over the course of 
this project, and hope that they will continue on some level.  Professor Lee, your ability 
to quickly absorb and provide input on the econometric issues in these papers was 
impressive and invaluable.  Professor Sivadasan, I could not imagine finding a more 
thoughtful and engaged cognate member for this committee.  And Professor Zimmerman, 
I benefitted from your wealth of knowledge and the rigor of your professional standards 
in our previous work together, and so your membership on this committee was a 
particular inspiration for me. 
For planting the seeds that encouraged me to undertake this effort, despite the 
passage of years since my first attempt, I owe thanks to Ellen Hughes-Cromwick.  And  
iv 
for his unvarnished advice on this and all other pursuits, I am eternally grateful for the 
friendship of Philip Bartholomew. 
Finally, neither this dissertation nor anything else I have achieved would have 
been possible without two extraordinary people:  my father, my first and favorite 
economics teacher; and my mother, my first and most trusted advisor.  Thank you for 
being there through it all. 
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DEDICATION         ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS        iii 
LIST OF FIGURES         vii 
LIST OF TABLES         viii 
CHAPTER 
1. INTRODUCTION       1 
2. EVALUATING CONVERGENCE IN GLOBAL            
MANUFACTURING COMPENSATION COSTS   3 
Section 
1.  Convergence in Context 
2.  Convergence Conditions Defined 
3.  Stylized Facts on Growth and Compensation Convergence 
4.  Trade Theory Implications for Convergence in Wages 
5.  Characteristics of Existing Empirical Tests for Convergence 
6.  A New Framework for Empirical Tests of Convergence 
7.  Empirical Results 
8.  Tracing Country Transition Paths 
9.  Comparison of Results with Other Convergence Methods 
10. Conclusions and Areas for Further Research 
Appendix 
References 
3. CONVERGENCE IN A MULTI-CONE HECKSCHER-OHLIN          47 
FRAMEWORK         
1.  Approaches to the GDP/Wage Gap 
2.  Globalization, GDP and Wage Growth 
3.  Heckscher-Ohlin Models and Convergence 
4.  Regression Tests of Heckscher-Ohlin Models 
5.  Characterization of GDP and Labor Cost Data 
6.  Regression Framework 
7.  Regression Results 
8.  Examination of Country Fixed Effects 
9.  Conclusions and Areas for Further Research 
Appendix 
References 
4. EXPLAINING WEAK GROWTH IN MEXICAN                         93 
MANUFACTURING COMPENSATION     
1.  Motivation for the Study 
2.  Mexico's Economic and Wage Growth in Global Perspective 
3.  The Influence of Intra-Industry Trade 
vi 
4.  Data Sources and Characteristics 
5.  Regression Framework 
6.  Regression Results 
7.  Interaction Term 
8.  Evaluating the Direction of Causation 
9.  Conclusions and Areas for Further Research 
Appendix 
References 
5. CONCLUSION        136 
 
vii 




2.1 Progression of GDP per Capita in Penn World Table Data   7 
2.2 Progression of Log(Comp) Data for Two Country Tiers   9 
2.3 Progression of Log(Comp) Data for Four Country Tiers   10 
2.4 Log(Comp) Adjusted for Changes in Trade-Weighted U.S. Dollar  11 
2.5 Illustration of hit Paths under Four Growth Scenarios   19 
2.6 Log(H1/Ht) Under Four Examples      24 
2.7 Transition Parameters for Convergence Clubs and Unallocated Countries 36 
3.1 Manufacturing Output and Employment     52 
3.2 Illustration of Two-Cone Heckscher-Ohlin Model    56 
3.3 Log(GDP per worker/Compensation Costs) Tiered by Final Wage Levels 59 
3.4 Historical Performance of Explanatory Variables by Country Grouping 60 
3.5 A Three-Sector Heckscher-Ohlin Model Illustrated    69 
4.1 Real GDP Growth for Mexico versus Rest-of-World Sample  96 
4.2 Compensation Costs for Mexico versus Rest-of-World Sample  98 
4.3 Manufacturing Value Added for Mexico versus Rest-of-World Sample 99 
 
viii 




2.1 Beta and Sigma Summary Statistics for BLS Data    10 
2.2 Results of Convergence Test Using Four Stylized Examples  23 
2.3 Results of Convergence Test for Four Country Tiers    26 
2.4 Results of Clustering Algorithm      29 
2.5 Illustration of Iterative Testing for Club 2 Sub-Tier    31 
2.6 Group Average Data for Identified Convergence Clubs   40 
3.1 Results of Regressing log(Manufacturing Compensation)   64 
on log(GDP/worker)         
3.2 Regression Results Using Full Sample     72 
3.3 Regression Results by Convergence Club     74 
3.4 Summary of Regression Results from Multiple-Cone   80 
Heckscher-Ohlin Perspective 
3.5 Selected Data from World Bank Survey of Labor Conditions  82 
4.1 Intra-Industry Trade with the U.S. by Manufacturing Subsector  105 
4.2 Average Annual Growth in Compensation Costs: 1992-2005  108 
4.3 Single-Variable Estimation with Chinese Trade Penetration   111 
4.4 2005 Compensation per Hour and Coefficient from Single-Variable 112 
 Chinese Trade Estimation 
4.5 Single-Variable Estimation with IIT Ratio     114 
4.6 Intra-Industry Trade and Coefficient from Single-Variable IIT Estimation 115 
4.7 Coefficients on Mexican Wages in Separate and Combined Regressions 117 
4.8 Sectors with Negative Wage Impact      118 
4.9 Coefficients from Combined Regression with Interaction Term  122 















Convergence in compensation costs, taking place over time and across countries, 
is an important issue in the economic literature from a theoretical and an applied 
perspective.  Several key theoretical models in economics point to convergence in wages, 
including the Solow macroeconomic growth model and Heckscher-Ohlin models of 
international trade.  These theories can be tested by looking for evidence of convergence 
in cross-country data.  Economic agents have a substantial interest in whether these 
theories hold true in practice, including multinational corporations seeking low-cost 
locations for global manufacturing operations. 
The first paper in this study explores the empirical evidence for convergence in 
global compensation costs in the manufacturing sector for a set of thirty-three developed 
and developing countries.  Evidence of convergence in compensation costs is apparent 
for selected groups of countries, with three distinct convergence clubs identified.   
These clubs are used in the second paper to identify the factors contributing to 
similar compensation cost outcomes within each group.  The study is undertaken in the 
context of a multiple-cone Heckscher-Ohlin trade model.  In that framework, GDP per 
capita and compensation costs should grow at a similar pace for countries that are 
established within a cone.  Gaps between GDP per capita and compensation cost growth 
2 
would only be observed for countries in transition from one cone to another, and should 
be associated with shifts in the composition of trade and of implied capital/labor ratios.  
A regression model is developed to test for the presence of multiple cones in the data. 
Finally, a country-specific exploration of compensation cost growth is undertaken 
for Mexico, which has demonstrated weaker than average compensation cost growth 
compared with the other developed and developing countries in the data set.  Two 
explanatory factors are considered that are often cited with regard to Mexican 
manufacturing performance.  Data on Mexican versus Chinese import penetration and 
the extent of Mexico's intra-industry trade with the U.S. are evaluated for their relative 
influence on Mexican compensation growth over the past decade. 
Taken together, these papers will help to address the question of whether, and by 
what mechanisms, the expansion of global trade in recent decades has driven factor price 











Section 1:  Convergence in Context 
Literature on cross-country convergence has focused largely on macroeconomic 
convergence, that is, in GDP per capita.  Traditional Solow growth models, after 
adjustments for differing levels of technology, population growth and saving rates, 
predict convergence in macroeconomic growth rates.  Such convergence has been 
demonstrated empirically for developed markets, with weaker results for groups of 
emerging markets. Such results are sometimes described as defining convergence "clubs". 
In the theoretical formulations of the macroeconomic growth literature, a key 
mechanism driving convergence is the dissemination of technological progress across 
countries.  If macroeconomic convergence is to occur via technology sharing, one way in 
which the dissemination of technology takes place is likely to be via multinational firms, 
as they seek out the lowest-cost sources of production to supply output to their global 
customers.  By replicating technological advances, either through investment in capital 
equipment or intellectual property such as manufacturing processes, multinational firms 
are a key potential facilitator of the transfer of technology across countries. 
What does this imply for wages?  In the standard Solow model, if a steady state 
exists with absolute convergence in per capita macroeconomic growth rates, wage rates 
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should also move toward convergence at the point where technology has been fully 
disseminated and all countries have reached diminishing production returns (after 
accounting for exogenous differences in population growth and saving rates, as these 
models typically do).  Testing of the wage convergence component of these models has 
not been widely undertaken, due in part to data limitations.  While the Penn World Table 
(PWT) and other large, cross-country datasets have been widely used to evaluate macro 
growth convergence, no such data sets exist with comparable cross-country data on 
wages. 
This chapter tests for the presence of convergence in wages using data on hourly 
manufacturing compensation costs from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Although 
the number of countries covered is much smaller than the PWT, the country coverage is 
relatively diverse in terms of compensation cost levels, including both high- and low-cost 
countries.  The data also are rigorously evaluated to be comparable across countries by 
accounting for all forms of compensation:  wages, holiday time, and other employer-paid 
benefits. 
The test used is a new econometric technique proposed by Philips and Sul (2007) 
and applied by those authors to demonstrate the presence of convergence at the 
macroeconomic level among groups of developed and emerging markets.  The results 
that will be developed in this paper suggest that there is evidence of convergence in 
wages for selected groups of countries within the dataset. 
A comparison of the Phillips and Sul approach with other existing methods of 
testing for convergence is also presented, with some important distinctions for the 
conclusion of convergence depending on the technique used.  The paper concludes that 
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the new technique is a useful contribution to the convergence debate, but that it has its 
own shortcomings.  It remains the case that no single approach provides a conclusive 
answer to the question of convergence.  Taken together, however, the different 
approaches offer a fairly robust picture of the dynamics behind convergence in global 
compensation costs. 
 
Section 2: Convergence Conditions Defined 
One of the conventional approaches to evaluating macroeconomic convergence is 
based on the Solow model, which posits economic growth as a function of initial income 
levels and the capital stock.  With total output Y a function of capital (K) and labor (L), 
and the production function assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale and diminishing 
marginal product of both inputs, we can write the production function as y = f (k) where 
lowercase letters indicate a variable per unit of labor. 
With such a production function, a regression equation can be specified of the 
general form: 
titititi Zykg ,,,, log εγβ +++=       (1) 
where g is the growth rate of per capita (assumed equal to labor force) income for 
country i; y is the level of per capita income; Z represents control variables, typically 
population growth rates and/or saving rates; and β  < 0 indicates convergence in per 
capita income growth. 
This formulation, presented as above by Durlauf, Kourtellos and Tan (2005) and 
similarly by others, follows from the theory that diminishing returns to capital limits the 
growth rate of more developed, i.e. higher income, countries, while less developed 
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countries in the process of augmenting their capital stock benefit from a faster rate of 
growth, thus driving eventual convergence.  This form is characterized as "absolute 
convergence", in the sense that the model predicts growth rates in all countries would 
equalize over time once the steady state level of capital is achieved.  Less restrictive 
formulations of this hypothesis, including Mankew, Romer and Weil (1992), allow for 
"conditional" convergence, or convergence of this type after allowing for differences in 
the control variables, which may include population growth rates, saving rates, human 
capital development and others.  These approaches to the convergence question will 
generally be referred to from here forward as "beta" convergence, in either absolute or 
conditional form. 
A second approach looks for declining variance of income across countries over 
time as a measure of convergence.  This approach, referred to as "sigma" convergence, 
has resulted in some key findings in the growth literature.  Sala-i-Martin (1996) and 
others have identified evidence of sigma convergence for samples of developed countries 
over time, but the hypothesis is generally rejected for a full sample including developed 
and emerging markets.1 
Finally, time series tests of convergence utilize unit root tests or look for trends in 
the cross-country differences in output that demonstrate time-invariant autocorrelation.  
An early version of this approach appears in Bernard and Durlauf (1995) and has been 
extended in subsequent studies.  As pointed out in Durlauf et al. (2005), studies based on 
this approach tend to reject the notion of convergence, other than for pairings or very 
specific groups of developed markets. 
                                                          
1 Sala-i-Martin (2006) uses a combination of per capita GDP and within country data on income dispersion 
to demonstrate that sigma convergence can be shown for individual incomes.  Population-weighted data 
produce similar results favoring convergence. 
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A new convergence test presented by Phillips and Sul (2007) combines properties 
of both the sigma and time series approaches.  This test will be described in detail in 
Section 6 and applied to test for convergence in compensation costs in Section 7.  The 
results are compared with other convergence approaches in Section 8. 
 
Section 3:  Stylized Facts on Growth and Compensation Convergence 
Discussions of global convergence in macroeconomic growth rates often include 
an illustration of the progression of world economic growth, such as that shown in 
Phillips and Sul (2005) and reproduced below as Figure 2.1.  The data, from the Penn 
World Table, cover the period 1960 through 1996, and countries are grouped by stage of 
development, as measured by initial income levels.   
 




One immediate point of interest is the smooth progression that is suggested by 
this presentation of the data.  Nonetheless, the continuum of growth in per capita GDP 
does not in itself imply convergence; in fact, if nations did follow a constant path of per 
capita GDP gains, convergence would not be possible as higher income countries would 
continually outpace lower income countries.   
Looking more closely at the chart, there is some evidence of beta convergence 
between the rich and richest countries as indicated by the height of the shaded areas, i.e. 
a steeper slope of the path for the rich country group versus the richest, leading them to 
"catch up".  However, there is little to suggest sigma convergence which would be 
indicated by a fall in the arrowed distance, i.e. the gap between richest and poorest 
countries at the beginning and end of the period. 
A parallel illustration can be drawn for cross-country labor compensation in the 
BLS data set, also using initial compensation to establish the groupings.  The complete 
list of countries and their rankings are shown in the Appendix. 
Given the smaller country sample (33 countries versus 88) and slightly shorter 
time series (32 years versus 37), we might not expect to see as much evidence of 
convergence, but in fact the outcome is quite similar to the macro growth picture.  Using 
the two-group case shown in Figure 2.2, a smooth trend can be identified with some 
evidence of convergence as the slope of the lower tier line is steeper than for the upper 
tier, as shown numerically in Table 2.1 (the evaluation of sigma and beta concepts will 
be roughly equivalent for a two grouping case, i.e. the distance between starting and 
ending point for the two tiers).  A four-group approach is shown in Figure 2.3, and 
generates a less continuous outcome.  However, this case does show evidence of beta 
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convergence between the bottom and low groups, and the middle and top groups, with 
the lower of each pairing demonstrating a steeper slope.  Interestingly, this formulation 
also suggests sigma convergence, which has not generally been the conclusion in studies 
of macro growth data, with the gap between the bottom and top group narrowing from 
the beginning to the end of the period.   Table 2.1 summarizes the numerical equivalent 
of the shaded areas and arrows in Figure 2.1, for the 2- and 4-group cases.  Note that 
these metrics are calculated from the raw data, not econometrically estimated, and are 
presented to demonstrate the general characteristics of the BLS data as compared with 
the Phillips and Sul illustration above.  These calculations will be revisited later in the 
chapter, and applied to the econometrically identified country groups, to further illustrate 
the different conclusions that may be drawn using these alternative approaches. 
 





































Table 2.1: Beta and Sigma Summary Statistics for BLS Data – Bottom/Top and 
Bottom/Low/Middle/Top Groups 
 
B2006-B1975 T2006-T1975 B2006-B1975 L2006-L1975 M2006-M1975 T2006-T1975
Beta Convergence 0.796 0.733 0.783 0.623 0.804 0.693
T1975-B1975 T2006-B2006 T1975-B1975 T2006-B2006
Sigma Convergence 0.744 0.680 0.976 0.886
B2006-B1975 L2006-L1975 M2006-M1975 T2006-T1975
Beta Convergence 1.291 1.131 1.313 1.201
T1975-B1975 T2006-B2006
Sigma Convergence 0.976 0.886
Two Country Groups Four Country Groups
Four Country Groups - Adjusted for TWD Changes
 
Beta convergence illustrated by a larger 1975-2006 change for low income countries versus high income 
 
Sigma convergence illustrated by a lower variance across high and low income countries in 2006 vs. 1975 
 
The data sample is slightly skewed toward richer countries, with 18 versus 15 
observations and 5 of the emerging markets' data beginning only in the 1990s.  This 
likely reflects the better quality and availability of compensation cost data for these 
nations.  However, there is a pattern of wage growth with a slowdown in the 1990s 
period that seems to be replicated to some degree across all four groups.  This is in part a 
reflection of the use of compensation costs measured in U.S. dollars.  Taking the log of 
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the trade-weighted U.S. dollar and adding it to the compensation series smoothes out 
most of this variation and is shown in Figure 2.4.  This mutes the calculation of beta 
convergence in Table 2.1, though the overall conclusion is the same, and does not impact 
the sigma convergence result since each country data point is being adjusted by the same 
factor in a given year.  Since the results in this paper will be more closely related to the 
sigma convergence concept, in that the relevant variable will be based on relative 
compensation cost across countries for a given point in time, the use of local currency 
versus U.S. dollar data should not affect the outcome.  Therefore, data in U.S. dollars 
will be used to facilitate the discussion and comparison of cross-country differences at 
any given time point without loss of validity. 
 
Figure 2.4:  Log(Comp) Adjusted for Changes in Trade-Weighted U.S. Dollar 



















Valuing labor costs at PPP versus market rates 
The question of PPP versus market exchange rates is also a key consideration in 
any study of cross-country data.  For purposes of the current chapter, it is closely related 
to the broader question of what dynamic is expected to drive convergence in labor costs 
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for the countries studied.  Stated simply, PPP compensation costs would reflect the 
variable of interest for a labor market participant evaluating where to offer his or her 
services.  Labor migration would be the dynamic of convergence in this case.   
Market exchange rates, by contrast, would be the variable of interest for an 
employer evaluating the cost of labor across markets to determine their allocation of 
capital to produce a good or service that includes some component designated for export.  
(If capital is being allocated to a country to support purely domestic production for the 
domestic market, exchange rates in any measure would have little impact on the 
decision.)  The convergence dynamic under consideration in this paper is capital 
allocation, similar to the technology diffusion theories of macroeconomic convergence.  
Therefore market exchange rates will be used as the basis for the compensation costs 
used in convergence tests. 
As a cross-check however, convergence tests were conducted on the whole 
sample, and on two-tier and four-tier groups based on PPP compensation cost rankings, 
to evaluate how this difference might drive the study results.  The rankings of 2006 
compensation costs using PPP exchange rates are shown in the Appendix for reference.  
While the PPP adjustment for exchange rates does alter the country rankings, and 
therefore the composition of the tiers, the conclusions regarding convergence were not 
significantly different.  The lowest and top tiers still failed to demonstrate convergence, 
and in fact the results for the middle two tiers were also weaker than in the non-PPP data.  
This result may be taken in support of the hypothesis that the behavior of employers, 
rather than labor market participants, is the driving force in cross-country convergence in 




Section 4:  Trade Theory Implications for Convergence in Wages 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) formally introduce trade and FDI to the 
neoclassical Solow model as a mechanism for technological dissemination, which allows 
for conditional convergence where follower countries are able to "catch up" to more 
developed countries because of the relative ease of adopting technology versus creating it. 
Another approach to understanding the relationship between trade and 
compensation costs comes from the Heckscher-Ohlin framework.  In particular, the 
theoretical result of factor price equalization due to trade has historically resulted in what 
is termed a "single cone" H-O model, where factor endowments across countries are 
relatively similar.  In extensions of H-O to allow for multiple cones, due to differing 
endowments or behavior, the assumption of global factor price equalization no longer 
holds.  Deardorff (2001) presents several examples of a multi-cone H-O model which 
provide additional insights for the actual patterns of trade and factor prices that we 
observe in real world data.  Importantly for purposes of this analysis, most neoclassical 
growth models, including Solow and extensions by Stiglitz (1970), are more consistent 
with multi-cone steady states.  Factor price equalization may occur within cones, but not 
across cones.  In such a world, we would not expect to see the lowest income countries 
converging with the highest income countries if they are not likely to occupy the same 
cone of specialization.  This result would be consistent with the presence of 
"convergence clubs" in the macro literature, and also turns out to be a very similar 
conclusion to our observations from the compensation cost data in this paper.   
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The multi-cone model is also interesting in the context of countries "jumping" 
from one cone to another.  In the BLS data, countries in the lower two tiers and upper 
two tiers show some propensity to switch groups, as shown in the Appendix table on 
country rankings, and significant changes occur in ranking within the tiers over this 30 
year time period.  However, there is very little movement between the lower two tiers 
and the upper two.  Japan and New Zealand are the only two countries that cross that 
boundary in this dataset.  This observation would be consistent with cones of 
specialization in which the lower and upper income countries are moving toward factor 
price equalization within each group, but not globally. 
The mechanisms by which trade may influence convergence outcomes are 
explored in more detail in Chapter 3.  For now, it suffices to keep in mind that trade 
theory offers a reason to expect convergence in wages across countries over time, under 
certain conditions which differ in some cases from the conditions imposed by macro 
growth theory. 
 
Section 5:  Characteristics of Existing Empirical Tests for Convergence 
Traditional beta and sigma tests for convergence suffer from some shortcomings 
that are especially important when considering cross-country panel data. 
Beta convergence is implied when lower initial income countries grow more 
rapidly than high income countries.  However, this condition only implies convergence if 
there is a single steady state.  An alternate possibility is that low income countries grow 
more rapidly but converge to a different (lower) steady state than high income countries.  
One such model is suggested by Azariadis and Drazen (1990) by introducing increasing 
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social returns to scale from investment in human capital.  The result is multiple steady 
states which depend on the initial stock of capital being above or below a certain 
threshold.  More generally, the ability of lower income countries to "catch up" to higher 
income countries requires a steady state of capital accumulation to be approached, which 
in reality is an implausible assumption.  If higher income countries continue to develop 
more advanced technologies and capital stock, the bar for lower income countries to 
converge is set ever higher. 
Sigma convergence looks for the compression of variation in cross-country per 
capita incomes over time.  In earlier growth literature, sigma convergence was 
sometimes asserted to be a subset of beta convergence, i.e. beta convergence implies 
sigma convergence will hold, but this is not in fact true.  This question became subject to 
dispute in reference to Galton's fallacy of regression towards the mean, attributed to the 
example of Francis Galton's 19th century analysis of the height distribution of the 
children of tall and short fathers.  Galton observed that the sons of tall fathers tended to 
be tall, but not on average as tall as their fathers, and similarly for the sons of short 
fathers.  He mistakenly concluded this to be evidence of height regressing to the mean, 
when in fact it was due to the normal distribution of height outcomes.  In the context of 
growth convergence, this concept has been used to demonstrate that a declining slope of 
the average growth curve (i.e. beta convergence) does not necessarily imply a 
compression in the variance across countries over time, or vice versa.  This topic is 
discussed at some length in the context of the convergence debate in Quah (1993) and 
elsewhere, and it has become an accepted principle of the growth literature that beta and 
sigma convergence are not equivalent measures. 
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A specific limitation of sigma convergence approaches, which is important for 
the current analysis, is that it does not provide a rigorous mechanism to evaluate 
convergence among subsets of countries, except by running the convergence test on ad 
hoc groupings and comparing the results. 
A common shortcoming to both beta and sigma approaches is that neither allows 
for an examination of the transitional behavior of cross-country growth differentials, 
which can help to address the Lucas assertion that currently observed income inequality 
is only a transient result of global industrialization (2002).   
In this context, the Philips and Sul approach provides two important advantages.  
First, they allow for variation in the exogenous factors both over time and across 
countries, which may better reflect reality.  Second, the introduction of a relative 
transition parameter describes the behavior of individual countries over time and allows 
for the possibility that these parameters may diverge for individual countries over certain 
periods without nullifying the conclusion of overall convergence.  These two 
contributions will be presented in more detail along with the outline of the model in 
Section 6. 
 
Section 6:  A New Framework for Empirical Tests of Convergence 
Several factors motivate the introduction of a new time series test of convergence.  
First, empirical research using improved panel data sets has highlighted the importance 
of heterogeneous agent behavior in evaluating macroeconomic outcomes.  Econometric 
theory is expanding to better support these types of studies, with one important direction 
of the literature focusing on models with a common factor and idiosyncratic effects, i.e. 
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different agents having different response functions to a given exogenous variable.  Early 
and influential examples of this approach include Temple (1999).  This type of approach 
has also become a useful course of work to expand empirical evidence around the 
convergence debate in the macro growth literature. 
Such studies take a model of a form similar to: 
Xit = δiμt + εit         (2) 
where μt represents the common component of the variable of interest, Xit, and can be 
applied generally as the aggregate behavior of X across all i, or may specifically be 
modeled as the response to a common external factor such as a prevailing interest rate.  
The factor δi represents the heterogeneous agent's response to the factor μt.  Phillips and 
Sul expand this approach by introducing a time-varying δit to capture the idiosyncratic 
effects of the common parameter, μt, for agent i over time.  In the context of a 
macroeconomic growth model, for example, μt could be technological change and δit 
would represent a country's facility in adopting new technology, and this is allowed to 
evolve over time as countries become more or less efficient at adopting new technologies.  
This facility could evolve due to trade, investment in human capital, and so forth. 
Phillips and Sul also introduce a relative transition parameter, hit, the calculation 
of which is shown below.  This parameter captures each country's share of average 
income, and it's evolution over time maps out a transition curve for each economy 
relative to the other countries in the dataset.  This is a valuable contribution in that it can 
be used to empirically estimate the speed of convergence as well as test whether 
convergence is present in the data. 




































,)1(1      (4) 
and using a fraction of the total time series T, with a sample of around 0.3T 
recommended to focus on the behavior of the series as it approaches its limit.  For 
purposes of this paper, i represents countries and X is labor compensation per hour.  The 
value hit by definition will average 1 across all i for any time t, and if the variance of hit 
converges toward zero as t increases, then the series Xit demonstrates convergence.  
Formally, a t-statistic on the coefficient b that is less than -1.65 leads to a rejection of the 
null hypothesis of convergence at the 5% level. 
Note also that, if μt is treated as a common external factor, then hit can be shown 




















       (5) 
which means that values of the transition parameters hit can be interpreted as measuring 
the path of the factors δit for the countries converging to a common δ over time.  This 
property of the model will be applied in a later section. 
Although Phillips and Sul present detailed derivations of the time series and other 
properties of their "log t" test, as they refer to their enhancement, some of the key 
properties of the regression equation and test results may not be immediately intuitive.  
19 
These properties, and some potential shortfalls of this approach, may best be 
demonstrated using a few stylized examples.   
To that end, I construct a sample of 10 countries, with initial compensation cost 
of 10 for country 1, 20 for country 2, and so on up to cost of 100 for country 10.  
Applying different growth paths to these 10 countries for 35 time periods and conducting 
the log t test can help provide a better sense of what behavior constitutes "convergence" 
under the properties of this test.  The charts of hit for four specific examples are shown in 
Figure 2.5. 
 
Figure 2.5:  Illustration of hit Paths under Four Growth Scenarios 
















































































The dependent variable Ht is constructed as the variance of all the hit at time t as 
above.  The ratio of H1 to Ht then becomes part of the left hand side variable in the 
regression equation.  This variable is charted in Figure 2.6 for each of the four cases 
considered here, with the results summarized in Table 2.2.  The first example is an 
extreme case where neither the level nor variance of compensation changes over time.  In 
this case, H1/Ht equals 1 for all time periods, and the log t test clearly fails to demonstrate 
convergence.  Example 2 imposes a form of catch-up, with the bottom five countries 
growing at 6% annually and the top five growing at just 5%.  In this example, the faster 
growth rate for the poorer countries is not sufficient to overcome the initial inequality, 
and the gap between rich and poor continues to expand over time, failing to show 
convergence.  Note that this case would be considered convergence in the beta 
formulation. 
Example 3 imposes a more substantial catch-up assumption, with the lowest 
country growing at 10%, the second lowest at 9%, and so on up to the richest country 
growing at 1% over the 35 time periods.  This example generates changes in rank among 
the countries, with the lowest country actually displacing the highest in rank by the end 
of the period, and the countries in the middle originally becoming the highest in the final 
rankings.  It is also important to note that the final variance in this case is materially 
higher than in the initial period, which means that this case would not be an example of 
convergence using a traditional sigma test.  This example does pass the convergence test 
using the log t approach, with a t-statistic of -1.0>-1.65 as required at the 5% significance 
level. 
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Example 4 uses a compression in variance across the countries, but no changes in 
rank.  This case does not pass the log t convergence test, despite having a lower variance 
at time 35 as compared with the initial period (and thus passing a convergence test using 
the sigma approach). 
These examples illustrate the sensitivity of the log t test to the relative growth 
performance of each country in the dataset.  Simply reducing the gap among countries 
(as in the sigma definition) is not sufficient to demonstrate convergence.  And the 
relatively weak acceptance of convergence in Example 3 reflects the consideration that 
countries also must stabilize in a new growth paradigm; if the same uneven growth 
patterns were extended further over time, the falling behind of the originally high-income 

























































































































































































































































































































































The examples also raise some questions about the log t test, however.  Example 4 
would appear on the surface to be a case that we would want to see classified as 
convergence, and it would be according to a traditional sigma test.  But it does not meet 
the criteria outlined by Phillips and Sul.  This is an important consideration, and indicates 
that no single convergence test that is in the toolkit today offers a definitive answer to the 
convergence question.  I will return to this question in a direct comparison of the various 
convergence approaches and their application to the BLS data later in the paper. 
A key advantage of the Phillips and Sul approach, as discussed in the previous 
section, is the ability to track the relative convergence of countries using the individual 
hit paths, or "transition parameters".  The four charts above showing the transition 
parameters hit for the 10 hypothetical countries in these examples offer a simple way to 
capture the dynamics underlying the log t test results.  It becomes apparent that Example 
3, which demonstrates convergence using the log t test, includes a relatively steady pace 
of transition, whereas in Example 4, there is a rapid move toward convergence in the 
early period but the pace slows significantly by the middle of the period and prevents 
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true "catching up".  The exploration of such transition parameters will offer a useful tool 
for evaluating the convergence results in the BLS data, and are discussed in Section 9. 
 
Section 7:  Empirical Results  
This section presents empirical results using the log t test for the purpose of 
evaluating the presence of convergence in labor compensation costs.  Tests were 
conducted on data from the International Labor Comparisons section of the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS), including total hourly compensation costs for manufacturing 
workers in 33 countries.   
Because of the cross-country sample underlying the variance statistic, the errors 
in the estimated regression are likely to demonstrate heteroskedasticity, and a 
heteroskedastic-consistent (HC) estimator is required for the estimation.  The White 
estimator is used for purposes of this analysis, which does not alter the value of the 
coefficient but does produce consistent standard errors, which is important since the t-
statistic is the basis for the convergence test. 
A first regression was applied to the full country sample.  Not surprisingly, as 
with the typical results in the macroeconomic growth literature discussed in Section 3, 
convergence was rejected for the full 33 country data set, with a t-statistic of -16.2, well 
below the threshold of -1.65. 
Tests for convergence were then conducted for the other subgroups illustrated 
earlier in this paper.  For the two group case, high and low, the low country group did not 
pass the convergence test, with a t-statistic of -9.8.  Similar to results in the 
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macroeconomic growth literature, the high country group did pass the convergence test, 
though just marginally, with a t-statistic of -1.53. 
The results for the four tier case would be expected to show improved results, by 
further distilling the countries into related groups.  The countries in the middle tier 
clearly passed the convergence test, with a t-statistic of 3.9, while the low tier failed by a 
small margin with a t-statistic of -1.83.  Neither the top nor the bottom tiers were close to 
demonstrating convergence, as shown in Table 2.2.  This is surprising in the sense that 
the top group of countries is usually considered to be the most similar in terms of 
economic development and other fundamentals and thus the most likely to converge in 
the macro literature. 
 





Top -0.88 -2.63 No
Middle 4.21 3.94 Yes
Low -0.29 -1.82 No
Bottom -1.88 -3.99 No  
 
These results suggest that the clustering algorithm used by Phillips and Sul to 
establish "convergence clubs" is a similarly relevant concept for labor compensation as it 
is for macroeconomic growth, since the composition of the country groups does seem to 
influence the conclusion regarding convergence.  For example, if we simply looked at 
the two group case, we might conclude that the high income countries converge while 
the low income countries do not.  But further disaggregating these results into four equal 
tiers, we observe that it is the middle group of markets, rather than the highest or lowest 
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income countries, that shows the strongest evidence of convergence.  Rather than using 
ad hoc groupings in a search for convergent subgroups, the use of a clustering algorithm 
will provide a systematic method for identifying which subgroups of countries 
demonstrate convergence properties.   
 
Identifying Convergence Clubs 
A useful corollary to the log t test is the potential to apply it iteratively for the 
identification of convergent subgroups within a dataset.  The procedure is outlined in 
detail in Phillips and Sul (2007) and is based on the assumption that there is a core group 
of countries that demonstrate convergence.  Starting from the highest two countries in the 
data sample, one country at a time is added and the log t regression is run.  The initial 
core group of countries is chosen to maximize the t-statistic, always subject to the 
minimum t = -1.65 to ensure convergence is present.  The maximization of the t-statistic 
gives a high degree of confidence in convergence for these markets.  Additional 
countries can then be added to this subgroup, again adding one member at a time and 
running the log t test up to the point that the t-statistic reaches -1.65 and the group is 
complete.  A higher threshold can be used for the t-statistic in this second round if there 
is a priori theoretical or empirical evidence to question the likelihood of a country's 
membership in the group.  This consideration will be relevant for some of the countries 
in the current data set. 
The initial results of applying the clustering algorithm are presented in Table 2.4.  
Three convergent groups can be identified based on a strict application of the algorithm.  
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There are 7 countries remaining that are not able to be included in one of these three 
clubs. 
The detailed composition of the clubs is listed in the Appendix.  Club 1 is 
composed primarily of small, northern European nations that have the highest 
manufacturing wages in the country set.  With the exception of Austria and Belgium, 
these countries were all at the top of the country rankings in both 1975 and 2006.  This 
grouping will be identified as the "High Wage" group. 
Club 2 is surprisingly large, and consists of countries from diverse regions and, in 
the aggregate, substantially different levels of compensation even in the final period.  
The spread from lowest to highest compensation for the members of this club in 2006 is 
from $7.65 for Portugal to $29.90 for Finland.  This group includes the United States, as 
well as key markets in Europe and Asia.  As will be shown in the next section, this 
country set may be broken into two convergence clubs, labeled the "Industrial Core" and 
the "Catching Up". 
Club 3 consists of Hong Kong and Taiwan and will be labeled the "China 
Moons".  Of the 7 remaining unallocated markets, all but two of them are countries that 
had truncated data availability.  This issue will be addressed later in this section. 
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Club 1 3 -0.15 7 -0.19 -1.95
"High Wage"
Club 2 Full 9 5.7 17 4.8 1.2
Club 2 Top Tier 9 5.7 10 4.2 3.4
"Industrial Core"
Club 2 Lower Tier 5 6.9 7 2.4 0.8
"Catching Up"
Club 3 2 0.9 2 0.9 -3.7
"China Moons"  
 
Decomposing Club 2 
There does appear to be relevant information in looking beyond a "country-blind" 
application of the t-test, and taking into account the economic characteristics of the clubs. 
This is of particular interest for the large middle grouping of countries in the data set.  To 
explore this question, a series of t-tests was generated from multiple starting points for 
the lower tier of countries in the second identified club.  Table 2.5 shows the country-by-
country results of the t-tests for these markets. 
The first set of t-statistics illustrates the results when these countries are added 
sequentially to Club 2, forming the full 17-country club.  Although the t-statistics are 
valid for these countries to be included, all the way though the addition of Portugal at 4.8, 
the development status of those markets in the original core of the club as compared with 
those at the lower end of the group is certainly distinct, in addition to the dispersion of 
compensation levels already noted.  Further, the t-statistics show a pattern of falling, then 
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increasing again as the tests progress through the lower tier of markets. This also 
suggests that there may be another "core" group, with a higher degree of convergence, 
nested within this sub-tier. 
If, instead of adding these countries to the existing core group, a new group is 
created beginning with the first non-core country Japan, a striking result emerges.  The 
first two members of the new group, Japan and Spain, pass the log t test but with a very 
low t-statistic, suggesting that these two countries do not form a strong "core" for the 
lower tier.  Beginning instead with Spain and Greece, the t-statistic improves, and rises 
even more if Greece and Korea are taken as the starting point.  This might argue for 
inclusion of Spain in the upper tier.  However, returning to the results in the first column, 
Spain marks the low point of the t-statistics in the Full Club 2 progression. 
These results suggest Spain is very much on the cusp of the upper "Industrial 
Core" and the "Catching Up" groups.  Looking at the underlying compensation cost data 
for Spain supports this conjecture.  Table 2.6 shows the average growth in compensation 
for each convergence club, and the individual growth rates for countries in the Industrial 
Core and Catching Up groups.  Spain's growth rate is higher than the average for the 
industrial core countries, where only two markets (the UK and Ireland) have growth rates 
equal to or higher than Spain's.  On the basis of historical performance, and the fact that 
Portugal is another member of the group, I will include Spain in the "Catching Up" club.  
However, either grouping can be justified based on the test results.  Any further results 
dependent on this categorization will be tested for their sensitivity to the allocation of 















Japan 4.2 n/a n/a n/a
Spain 3.4 -0.7 n/a n/a
Greece 3.6 -0.4 0.2 n/a
Korea 7.1 0.8 5.1 4.3
New Zealand 5.5 0.6 6.8 5.5
Israel 5.9 0.4 6.9 6.2
Singapore 6.3 -0.3 3.3 3.1
Portugal 4.8 -0.9 2.4 1.7
Hong Kong 1.2 -1.8 0.8 0.4
Taiwan -2.2 0.2 0.0
Memo:  T-statistic for Hong Kong/Taiwan Stand Alone Group 0.9
Table 2.5:  Illustration of Iterative Testing for Club 2 Sub-Tier
 
 
Remaining Unallocated Markets 
The Unallocated Markets are difficult to assess due to the limited data series for 
several of these markets.  The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Brazil and the 
Philippines all have compensation cost data that begin at 1991 or later.  For example, the 
Czech Republic actually would have passed the log t test to become the 18th member of 
the large version of Club 2.  But because the Czech data only cover the period from 1995 
forward, and given the substantial drop in the t-statistic when that market was added to 
the club, it was not included even though the t-statistic did meet the -1.65 threshold.  
This is another example where it may make sense to use applied judgment in overriding 
the blind test results, in this case, the shortened data series leading to a higher test 
threshold for a country's addition to a convergence club. 
These remaining markets are of significant economic interest, however, in 
seeking to address the question of newly emerging markets and the potential path for 
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compensation costs in these countries to grow over time.  As an attempt, a series of log t 
tests was conducted on the shortened data series, with the full acknowledgement that 
these results are less robust.  Nonetheless, there may be information to glean even from 
this limited look at the data.  In fact, the log t test on the shortened time series supported 
the hypothesis of convergence for all of the remaining countries, with t-statistics ranging 
from 5.4 to 13.6.  While we would want to apply a higher threshold for the t-statistic in 
the case of this limited data series (from just 1997 through 2006) the 13.6 t-statistic may 
still point to a core convergent group among these countries that consists of Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Hong Kong and Taiwan.  Interestingly, Brazil and Mexico 
do not show strong evidence of convergence, nor do the Eastern European countries 
taken as a stand alone group.  These results, as well as the decomposition of the initial 
large Club 2, points to a conclusion that will be explored more fully in the next section, 
that is the relevant economic grouping for compensation cost convergence does not 
appear to be geographic. 
The shorter time series results do suggest that there may be economic factors 
driving more rapid convergence in the period since the mid-1990s.  For example, as 
globalization became more pronounced due to broader trade agreements and 
technological advances over this period, compensation gaps across countries may have 
begun to close more rapidly.  Further, the global economy faced significant economic 
shifts in the mid-1990s, many of which directly affected the emerging markets in the low 
country group.  These include the Mexican peso devaluation in 1994, the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997, and a redrawing of the political and economic map in Europe during this 
time.  As the global economy recovered from these setbacks and entered a period of 
33 
more or less uninterrupted and aligned economic expansion, outcomes might be more 
likely to show convergence.  This hypothesis will be examined in Section 8, using the 
transition paths traced out by the variable ht, termed the "transition parameter" by 
Phillips and Sul. 
 
Section 8:  Tracing Country Transition Paths 
The results in the preceding section are of empirical interest, but an additional 
goal of this analysis is to apply these results in understanding the patterns of wage 
convergence.  In that regard, we will examine the transition parameter hit, and illustrate 
how these parameters compare against emerging and developed markets in the data 
sample.  These transition parameters capture the performance of compensation costs in 
each market relative to the average of all others in the sample at time t, and can be 
interpreted as indicating the speed of convergence.  Charting these "transition 
parameters" over time thus illustrates the path that convergent countries follow, and can 
also highlight where other countries may have fallen behind. 
Figure 2.7 shows the transition parameters for the key convergence clubs and 
unallocated countries.  Although Norway seems to accelerate somewhat as compared to 
its peers, the relationship among the High Wage markets is quite consistent, with 
relatively flat curves other than for Austria, which offers an illustration of catching up, as 
the country moved up from 21st in the 1975 income rankings to join this top tier of 
countries in compensation cost by 2006 (see data in the Appendix for country 
compensation costs and rankings in first and final periods). 
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In contrast, the Industrial Core group shows a much less consistent path, 
particularly in the first half of the period.  The curves for the U.S., Canada and Australia 
peak in the mid-1980s, while countries like the UK, Ireland and Japan start near the low 
end of the group but move up by the end of the period.  The starting and ending points 
for the group give a visual illustration of convergence, in this case taking relatively 
independent paths to arrive at a similar end point. 
The visual indication from the transition parameters also seems to confirm 
splitting out the Catching Up countries from the Industrial Core.  The Catching Up group 
of countries follow a similar transition path, with the possible exception of Korea which 
seems to demonstrate a more marked uptrend.  But the final distribution of countries is 
not significantly more compressed than in the initial period. 
The Unallocated Markets clearly have a lower level of relative compensation 
costs than even the Catching Up group, making it difficult to anticipate a path for these 
markets to converge with the other groups over any foreseeable time period.  But they 
also demonstrate very divergent growth paths within the group, with Singapore and Sri 
Lanka having very flat transition curves, Mexico and Brazil demonstrating a downward 
trend after initially higher performance, and the Eastern European markets showing some 
upward trend, based on a relatively short data sample. 
The case of Brazil's downward shift in compensation costs can be attributed in 
part to that country's massive currency devaluation in 1999,  but Mexico's performance 
before the 1994 peso devaluation suggests the pre-devaluation peak in Brazil was also 
inflated by economic conditions leading up to the currency crisis.  In other words, many 
of the same imbalances that generated the currency overvaluation and decline also 
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contributed to a distortion of labor compensation costs.  This is a topic that has been 
explored elsewhere in the literature, but additional work could be done on these 
questions in future research. 
Given the relatively small sample of emerging markets in this dataset, it is likely 
that key convergence relationships are being omitted here.  For example, a key 
competitor of Mexico in many of its destination markets is China.  Mexico's downward 
trend in compensation costs could be associated with the growing trade presence of 
China over the past two decades.  Although compensation cost data for China are very 
limited, it is clear from the available data that current compensation costs in China are 
still well below those in the Mexico.  Lett and Bannister (2006) estimated manufacturing 
compensation in China at $0.67 per hour in 2004, just 27% of compensation costs in 
Mexico.  Thus, we might expect continued restraint in the growth of Mexican 
compensation costs as Mexican firms compete with Chinese manufacturing sources for 





















































































































































































Section 9:  Comparison of Results with Other Convergence Methods 
Returning to the comparison of this convergence test approach to other methods 
discussed in Section 5, we can now compare the outcome of the log t test to the sigma 
and beta approaches to see what conclusions we might draw using any one of these tools. 
The log t test provides a robust answer to a fairly narrow question related to 
convergence; that is, to identify groups of countries which have demonstrated a 
propensity to converge to a common steady state in response to a universal external 
factor such as technology.  This identification is a useful addition to the toolkit of 
economists exploring these questions.  It also provides guidance on the speed of 
convergence within groups, as illustrated by the transition curves in the previous section, 
but it does not offer a direct answer to the question of how quickly the groups might 
converge with each other.  However, this section will show that the combination of the 
log t test and other approaches can generate a fairly robust picture of the dynamics 
underlying global convergence in compensation costs. 
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The group average data in Table 2.6 can be used to illustrate the beta and sigma 
results for convergence between the same country groups identified using the log t test, 
including the decomposition of the second large club into the Industrial Core and 
Catching Up groups.  Beta convergence between groups would be indicated if the growth 
rate for the lower income countries exceeded that for the higher income countries.  This 
does emerge in the data, although there is not a significant difference between the highest 
and lowest growth groups.  In fact, the lowest income countries, the Unallocated Markets, 
actually have the lowest average rate of growth in compensation.  Unfortunately, these 
results are skewed by the truncated data set for several of these countries as discussed 
previously.  The Catching Up countries do demonstrate a higher average growth rate than 
the Industrial Core and High Wage groups above them, which points to beta convergence 
of these groups. 
Taking the growth rates in Table 2.6 and applying them to the clubs identified 
using the log t test we can generate estimates of the time to convergence among the 
groups.  For the Catching Up countries, with an average annual growth rate of 7.4% as 
compared with 5.6% for the Industrial Core and High Wage groups, average 
compensation costs for these markets would catch up to the Industrial Core countries in 
38 years, and would overtake the High Wage countries in 53 years.2  For the China 
Moons, the time to catch up would be 58 years to the Industrial Core, and 68 years to the 
high wage countries.  Of course, the assumption of a constant growth rate over this entire 
period is questionable in a Solow-type world, as compensation cost growth likely would 
slow as the developing countries encounter diminishing returns to capital over time.  
                                                          
2 Years to convergence are measured from the conclusion of the existing data set, which ends in 2006, 
taking group average compensation costs for each of the clubs and extending the series at the average 
annual rate of change shown in Table 6. 
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That assumption would put these estimates at the early end of a potential range of catch 
up times. 
Sigma convergence, as measured by the gap between low and high wage country 
groups, has mixed evidence in this dataset.  The data in Table 2.6 show the average 
compensation levels for each group, which do not show evidence of compressed 
convergence among any of the groups.  In addition, offline calculations of the within 
group variance for each group also strongly refutes convergence; the variance from 
initial to final period is elevated in every case.  However, using compensation costs as a 
percent of the next highest country group, the Catching Up group does show evidence of 
closing the gap with the Industrial Core, as do the China Moons with the Catching Up.  It 
is notable, however, that the Industrial Core has not gained any ground on the High 
Wage group over this time period. 
For the beta convergence case, where there is some evidence of convergence, we 
do not have a rigorous method of grouping countries to identify convergence clubs.  One 
attempt might be to rank countries by growth rate; as the data in Table 2.6 suggest, this 
would result in some significant reclassifications of key markets.  The UK's relatively 
high wage growth, for example, would lead us to allocate this market to one of the lower, 
Catching Up, groups.  On the other hand, markets such as Portugal, with low wage levels 
but also a relatively slow rate of growth, might not be identified as convergent at all. 
These results illustrate that, despite the potential for mixed signals on 
convergence identified using the constructed data examples in Section 4, the iterative log 
t test does offer a useful tool to identify country relationships that cannot be captured 











Comp Cost as 
% of Next 
Higher Group 
(1976)
Comp Cost as % 
of Next Higher 
Group (2006)
High Wage 5.6% 6.2                        33.4                     n/a n/a
Industrial Core 5.6% 4.8                        25.7                     78% 77%
Catching Up 7.4% 1.7                        13.3                     36% 52%
China Moons 8.2% 0.6                        6.1                       32% 46%
Unallocated Markets 4.2% 0.9                        3.9                       n/a* 64%
*Group average reflects truncated data series for some of these countries
Memo: By Country
Average Annual 
Growth Rate in 
Compensation




Korea, Republic of 13.1%
Greece 7.5%
Spain 6.7%










Table 2.6:  Group Average Data for Identified Convergence Clubs
 
 
Section 10: Conclusions and Areas for Further Research 
This paper adds to the convergence literature in two ways.  First, techniques 
previously utilized to examine global macroeconomic convergence are applied to data on 
cross-country labor compensation costs.  This is an important extension of the 
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macroeconomic convergence literature, as wage convergence is an important corollary of 
key growth models, notably the Solow model and its extensions. 
Second, the introduction of the "log t" convergence approach, first presented and 
applied to economic growth data by Phillips and Sul, generates new insights into the 
grouping of countries by stage of development and growth paths.  The results may be 
more rigorous than existing sigma and beta approaches in identifying convergence clubs. 
A final consideration is that, whatever technique is applied, the conclusion of 
convergence in economic growth or compensation costs has a distinct meaning in the 
economic literature, and must be explained carefully in the communication of 
convergence results to other interested parties.  The examination in this paper, for 
example, was carried out in nominal USD terms under the hypothesis that actions by 
multinational firms are a key driver of convergence in wage costs.  While the fact that 
the cost gap between the Catching Up and Industrial Core countries narrowed by 16 
percentage points between 1976 and 2006 may be of significant interest to economists, a 
multinational firm looking for cost advantages in the global market likely would still see 
the 48% cost differential between these two groups in 2006 as a worthwhile opportunity 
to pursue.  When economists assert that absolute cost differentials are unlikely to persist 
over time, due to the theoretical and empirical results examined in this paper and by 
others, it may sometimes be overstated in the context that is most important to individual 
market agents.   
An equally important set of considerations for applied economic research, but one 
that is less often studied (in large part due to data limitations), are the offsets to absolute 
cost advantage, namely productivity growth, quality of labor force and of output, and so 
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on.  These factors have been examined to some extent in the trade literature, primarily in 
small samples of markets and in panels of plant- or firm-level data.  These considerations 
are important from both a theoretical and applied perspective, as they likely represent a 
key reason that convergence does not materialize as quickly as standard growth and trade 


































Sri Lanka 0.54 1 0.28 1
Philippines 1.07 2 N/A 4
Mexico 2.75 3 1.46 10
Brazil 4.91 4 N/A 12
Poland 4.99 5 N/A 7
Hong Kong SAR 5.78 6 0.75 5
Hungary 6.29 7 N/A 9
Taiwan 6.43 8 0.38 3
Czech Republic 6.77 9 N/A 8
Portugal 7.65 10 1.53 11
Singapore 8.55 11 0.84 6
Israel 12.98 12 2.02 14
New Zealand 14.47 13 3.27 17
Korea, Republic of 14.72 14 0.32 2
Greece 16.1 15 1.69 13
Spain 18.83 16 2.52 15
Japan 20.2 17 2.97 16
United States 23.82 18 6.16 28
France 24.9 19 4.49 20
Italy 25.07 20 4.64 22
Canada 25.74 21 6.11 27
Ireland 25.96 22 3.51 19
Australia 26.14 23 5.6 24
United Kingdom 27.1 24 3.35 18
Luxembourg 27.74 25 6.21 29
Finland 29.9 26 5.06 23
Austria 30.46 27 4.5 21
Switzerland 30.67 28 6.03 26
Sweden 31.8 29 7.12 33
Belgium 31.85 30 5.76 25
Netherlands 32.34 31 6.58 31
Denmark 35.45 32 6.23 30
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Composition of Convergence Clubs
High Wage China Moons
  C.^ Norway C. Hong Kong






Industrial Core Unallocated Countries
C. Finland
C. Luxembourg Sri Lanka




C. Italy *Czech Republic
C. France *Hungary
C. United States
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CONVERGENCE IN A MULTI-CONE HECKSCHER-OHLIN FRAMEWORK 
 
 
Section 1:  Approaches to the GDP/Wage Gap 
 
Economic historians have generated a robust debate regarding GDP per capita 
versus wage growth in the early industrial period.  However, relatively few studies have 
been conducted on the differential between GDP and wage growth in the more recent 
economic era.  Of these studies, most have emphasized the quantification of the 
GDP/wage differential.  Attempts to explain the reasons for divergent GDP and wage 
growth have focused on the accounting factors (i.e. labor force participation rates) and 
proxies for productivity growth.   
A second strand of the economic literature that is relevant to the GDP/wage 
growth question is the development of dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin models as a tool to 
evaluate the conditions under which the model's standard conclusions apply in a multi-
period setting.  Of particular relevance for this paper are those studies that address factor 
price equalization.  The results of such models are generally mixed, and very sensitive to 
which of the static model assumptions are maintained or relaxed in the dynamic setting. 
This paper melds these two areas of exploration, and provides additional insights 
on the relative performance of GDP and wage growth by constructing an econometric 
framework, based on the dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin literature, and demonstrating that the 
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mixed results of prior studies may be attributable to the restrictions of a single-cone 
model.  The paper concludes that the way in which countries are grouped may 
significantly influence conclusions as compared with prior studies.  A key feature of this 
study is allowing for differences in determinant factors across countries in different 
stages of development and within different cones of specialization.  This approach leads 
to a trade-theoretical explanation for observed cross-country differences in GDP and 
wage growth. 
 
Section 2:  Globalization, GDP and Wage Growth 
Much of the work in Chapter 2 took analysis previously conducted on 
macroeconomic growth rates and applied it to labor compensation costs, to which I will 
refer for convenience as wages.  A second, related question is the degree to which wage 
growth tracks macroeconomic growth.  As discussed in the previous chapter, growth 
theory points toward equalization of GDP growth and compensation to factors of 
production in a steady state, but under what conditions would we expect to see a different 
real-world outcome?  This question is interesting for several reasons. 
First, while broad economic growth measures are relevant in comparing the 
performance of nations as a whole, the behavior of individual market participants, be 
they firms or consumers, will be driven by other component variables such as wages.  As 
such, looking at the paths of these specific variables can help to explain the reasons for 
macroeconomic convergence or lack thereof, in addition to simply identifying its 
presence. 
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Second, the distribution of GDP between labor and other factors of production is 
important in understanding the standard of living for individuals within a nation.  This is 
a priority in many of the economic history studies on this subject.  Although welfare 
effects are not a focus of the current study, the results of this chapter could be extended 
to address such questions.  To undertake such a study, data adjusted for PPP rather than 
market exchange rates might be more appropriate.  However, in the context of a multi-
cone model of international trade, this paper will illustrate that gaps between nominal 
GDP and wages are not only possible but likely, as countries move between cones of 
specialization.  This framework will also help to explain some of the results that are 
observed in the data. 
Finally, one reason that GDP may be used more frequently than wages in studies 
of relative national performance is that GDP data are readily available for a wider set of 
countries and over longer periods of time.  If we can garner a better understanding of the 
relationship between GDP and wages for a reasonable representative sample of markets, 
we may be able to use existing data on GDP and other explanatory variables to infer 
something about current or future wage rates in a broader sample of markets.  
Work by economic historians has addressed this question for pre-industrial 
Europe, where a persistent gap between real wage growth and per capita GDP has been 
identified and studied in fairly great detail (though without a consensus on its 
explanation).  The parallel with early European economies may be of particular 
relevance for today's emerging markets.  In particular, an examination of the economic 
history literature regarding wages and GDP could offer insights into the path that large, 
emerging industrial economies such as China may be following today. 
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However, the parallels between early economic history and modern times are not 
often addressed directly in the economic literature.  In their 1999 book, O'Rourke and 
Williamson make this point, comparing the period of rapid globalization in the late 19th 
century with that at the end of the 20th century: 
 
As economists today debate globalization issues, they treat the 
phenomenon as if it is unique to our time, seemingly unaware of 
how directly the first great globalization boom speaks to the second.  
A conversation between the two is long overdue. 
 
Studies on this question applied to modern economies have looked at the 
relationship between GDP per capita and wages, but with a focus on quantifying the gap, 
measuring the contribution from accounting factors such as labor force participation, and 
identifying proxies for productivity growth to explain growth differentials.  However, 
these studies do not address the reasons why such differentials may emerge or persist.  I 
will return to this question with the trade-theoretical framework in Section 3. 
One common element in studies by economic historians and other researchers in 
this area is the use of a national accounts framework to illustrate conditions under which 
convergence in macroeconomic growth would imply convergence in wages as well.  
Angeles (2007) derives such a framework in some detail to explore the GDP/wage gap in 
pre-industrial Europe.   Warner (2006) uses a similar approach in a study of occupational 
wages and GDP in modern economies.  Warner concludes that GDP per capita exceeding 
wage growth for a particular occupation or sector, such as manufacturing, can be 
explained by a few broad factors falling out of the basic national income accounting 
framework. The key factors are (1) rising labor force participation; (2) faster growth in 
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other sectors' wages, or in profits; and (3) migration of labor toward other sectors with 
higher wages. 
Rising labor force participation is determined to be a key factor in both of these 
studies, and in most other studies in this area.  It also is relatively easy to account for 
empirically.  However, labor force participation does not appear to explain the entire 
GDP/wage gap, leading to the focus of other studies on measuring and evaluating 
productivity growth as the secondary force. 
Following the principle that labor is compensated at its marginal product, one 
underlying explanation of the forces above would be that productivity growth in the 
slower wage growth sector is slower than the aggregate rate of productivity growth for 
the economy.  However, this productivity shortfall does not appear to be the case in the 
performance of manufacturing, where for example U.S. manufacturing productivity has 
grown on average 1.7 percentage points more quickly than in the overall nonfarm 
business sector since 1990.  The data for other developed markets are similar; such a 
breakdown of productivity growth by sector is less readily available for the emerging 
markets.  However, as shown in Figure 3.1, overall manufacturing productivity also 
appears to have risen as evidenced by the 7 percentage point decline in employment in 





                                                          
3 Data in figure 3.1 are the unweighted average of manufacturing share of output and employment in 




Figure  3.1:  Manufacturing Output and Employment 
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The capital/labor ratio is another key factor that is relevant both to the 
productivity growth discussion and also the trade framework, to the extent that it reflects 
the endowment of each country and indicates the direction of comparative advantage.  Its 
role may be different depending on the country's stage of development.  In the 
development stage, incremental capital may be added to support the addition of more 
workers into the manufacturing sector.  To the extent these workers are coming from a 
less productive sector, such as agriculture, the additional capital would add to both 
overall and manufacturing sector productivity, and raise the wage once changes in labor 
force participation are accounted for.  If the capital represents a labor-saving technology, 
such as might be expected in the more capital-abundant developed markets, then labor 
demand in the manufacturing sector would decline along with wages, potentially leading 
to an exodus of workers from the sector as labor shifts to more attractive opportunities.  
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Either of these cases would imply the relationship between the GDP/wage gap and 
capital formation should be positive. 
To fully explain shifts in labor force participation, capital formation, and GDP 
and wage growth, however, we need to move beyond the national accounts framework 
and apply a robust theoretical model of growth and factors of production.  To this end, 
trade theory and, in particular, studies extending the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model to 
a dynamic environment offer a useful starting point. 
 
Section 3:  Heckscher-Ohlin Models and Convergence 
Trade theory would seem to be a natural source of more detailed explanations for 
the mechanism by which convergence may or may not occur.  In particular, the standard 
Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) result of factor price equalization (FPE) offers a direct parallel to 
the question of wage convergence.  A recent resurgence of interest in dynamic HO 
models - that is, combinations of static HO models with multi-sector growth models - 
confirms the appeal of this approach.  These models explore what happens when 
countries with different initial endowments interact over time.  However, across the 
growing literature on dynamic HO models, there is a wide range of conclusions 
regarding the robustness of the FPE result depending on the particular set of assumptions 
that are imposed. 
In fact, FPE itself is sometimes imposed as an assumption on these models, 
generally resulting in multiple steady states in which initial endowments are the 
determinant of where a particular economy will converge.  In other cases, conditions are 
established such that initial endowments become irrelevant to the conclusion of 
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convergence after the initial period or periods.  For example, Chatterjee and Shukayev 
(2006) show that the introduction of uncertain technological shocks can reverse the 
conclusion of income convergence as compared to a deterministic dynamic model, which 
generates income convergence even with large differences in initial endowments.  Others, 
such as Ventura (1997) and Bajona and Kehoe (2008), look at the relationship between 
factor endowments, specialization, and convergence and conclude that the elasticity of 
substitution among traded goods determines whether income levels will converge.  
Further, Bajona and Kehoe construct an example where countries' income levels may not 
converge under an imposed assumption of factor price equalization, but also may 
converge when factor price equalization is not assumed.  This is a special case, but it 
illustrates the variability of outcomes that are derived from the theoretical literature on 
dynamic HO models. 
The result of factor price equalization due to trade has historically resulted from 
what is termed a "single-cone" HO model, where factor endowments across countries are 
relatively similar.  All of the dynamic HO models cited above are single-cone 
frameworks, and as noted result in varying conclusions regarding factor price 
equalization.  However, in extensions of HO to allow for multiple cones, due to differing 
endowments or behavior, the assumption of global factor price equalization no longer 
holds.  Deardorff (2001) presents several examples of a multi-cone HO model which 
provide additional insights for the actual patterns of trade and factor prices that we 
observe in real world data.  Importantly for purposes of this analysis, he also shows that 
most neoclassical growth models, including Solow and extensions by Stiglitz (1970), are 
more consistent with multi-cone steady states.  Factor price equalization may occur 
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within cones, but not across cones.  This is consistent with the presence of "convergence 
clubs" in the macro literature, and also turns out to be a very similar conclusion to the 
observations from the wage data in this paper. 
Formally extending the results of dynamic HO models to a multi-cone framework, 
while analytically daunting, likely would cloud the results even further.  However, as 
noted by Schott (2003) and others, ignoring the potential for multiple cones of 
specialization may lead us to inaccurate conclusions regarding wages and globalization.  
For example, Bajona and Kehoe (2006) show that international borrowing and lending 
generates factor price equalization regardless of the assumption of overlapping 
generations or infinitely-lived consumers.  In a multi-cone case, this conclusion would 
not hold and could lead to the conclusion of a GDP/wage gap in the process. 
To illustrate this difference, consider a simple illustration of a multi-cone HO 
model (Figure 2.2, reproduced from Deardorff (2001)) in which we retain labor rigidities 
across countries but allow for international borrowing and lending as in Bajona and 
Kehoe's analysis.  In the multi-cone case, it is possible for GDP to rise in the more labor-
intensive trading partner without an increase in wages.  Assume two countries, Country 1 
being labor-abundant and producing goods Z1 and Z2, and Country 2 being capital-
abundant and producing goods Z2 and Z3.  Country 2 can take advantage of the higher 
return to capital in Country 1, and shifts some of its allocation of capital there without 
moving outside of its cone.  At the margin, this increases the output of Country 1, which 
may be produced for local consumption or for export to Country 2.  Wages do not 
change in either country, since each is still within its cone.  This result requires other 
limitations on capital mobility to avoid complete equalization of returns to capital and 
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labor.  But even if we allow for that possibility, the equalization takes place at different 
country endowments, which is different than the single-cone case in Kehoe's example 
where equalization of returns to capital and labor can occur at any factor endowment 
within the cone.   
 







Section 4:  Regression Tests of Heckscher-Ohlin Models 
Several recent papers have noted the limitations of single-cone models in 
capturing the observed patterns of trade and income across countries.  In addition to 
Deardorff's review of growth models and support for multi-cone HO models, noted 
previously, there is a growing literature of empirical studies that either directly or 
indirectly address the question of multiple diversification cones. 
A range of papers on intra-industry trade, including Davis and Weinstein (2001), 
Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006), and Redding (2002), address the question of multiple 
cones indirectly, by demonstrating that aggregate industry data may mask important 
relationships between factor endowments, technology and factor prices.4  Papers looking 
at the elasticity of substitution as a key driver may also be interpreted as providing 
support for the multi-cone framework.  More direct evaluation of multi-cone cases has 
been undertaken by Schott (2003) and Bernhofen (2007), among others, with differing 
conclusions regarding the evidence for multi-cone steady states. 
These papers are similar in that they tend to focus on decomposing trade data in 
order to support evaluation of the factor proportions framework coming from HO theory.  
Their contribution is important in identifying limitations of the constant-technology 
assumption for countries with different initial endowments.  As Schott notes, output in a 
relatively labor-intensive manufacturing sector such as apparel may rise with capital 
accumulation for a labor-abundant country, but fall for a capital abundant one.  This 
observation also is consistent with the identification of convergence clubs in Chapter 2, 
                                                          
4 This feature of intra-industry trade dynamics will also be relevant to the analysis in Chapter 4 of 
variations in Mexican wage growth in subsectors of the manufacturing industry. 
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as groups of countries are identified approaching common steady states due to their 
similar adaptation to a common external factor such as technology. 
This paper utilizes such insights, but takes a different approach to the 
convergence question by looking at highly aggregated data for three sectors: 
manufacturing, agriculture, and services.   This approach is further guided by utilizing 
information on groups of countries where there is a priori evidence of convergence in 
manufacturing wages.  These groups can be broadly thought of as potential "cones" of 
diversification, within which factor price equalization should hold.  Once the cones have 
been established, I examine the relationship between determinants of GDP and 
manufacturing wages for each group.  If these groups do represent multiple cones of 
diversification with different factor endowments and potentially different productive 
technologies across cones even for the same sector, we would expect to see variation in 
the influence of these determinants on GDP and manufacturing wages across groups.  In 
fact, that is a conclusion of the analysis. 
 
Section 5:  Characterization of GDP and Labor Cost Data 
The first Appendix table summarizes the average annual growth in GDP per 
capita and labor compensation costs in manufacturing (referred to for simplicity as 
wages) for the 33 countries in the dataset, grouped into the wage convergence clubs 
determined in Chapter 2.  It is striking that the average ratio of GDP growth to wage 
growth is quite close to 1 for most of these markets, notably in the more developed 
markets of the High Wage and Industrial Core groups.  Taking into account the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model implications, these data suggest that most of the developed 
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markets may be closer to a steady state level in their trade and production profiles.  There 
are notable exceptions among the unallocated markets, although the time series data for 
several of these countries, such as Brazil, are available only from the mid-1990s.  Even 
in the Industrial Core, however, Ireland, Luxembourg and most notably, the United 
States, are relative outliers with higher GDP growth relative to wages.  Greece, Korea 
and Israel stand out in the Catching Up group as having higher wage growth relative to 
GDP.   
If we are interested in convergence issues, time series characteristics of these data 
will also be important.  Figure 3.3 shows log (GDP per capita/labor cost) for the 33 
countries in the BLS dataset and World Bank data on GDP per capita.  For purposes of 
illustration, the countries are grouped into four groups, ranked from lowest to highest 
wages, parallel to the progression of wage levels in the convergence clubs. 
 








































































These data suggest that countries with higher wages have reached a period of 
greater stability in the relationship between GDP per capita and manufacturing wages, as 
evidenced by the bottom right panel.  The second tier of countries in the bottom left 
panel are more closely clustered, but still appear to be in a period of rising GDP relative 
to wages.  The data for the lower wage countries are much more dispersed, but with most 
markets demonstrating a similar trend of elevated GDP per capita growth. 
While these observations are interesting, a more important question for purposes 
of this analysis is the reason for these differences in relative growth rates of GDP and 
wages.  To address that question, World Bank data were also collected on labor force 
participation rates; percent of labor force employed in manufacturing, agriculture and 
services; capital formation (as % of GDP); and exports (as % of GDP) for each country.  
The rationale for including each of these factors is discussed in more detail in Section 6.  
Figure 3.4 shows how the key variables develop for the three convergence clubs and 
unallocated markets.  The second table in the Appendix illustrates how these variables 
differ across the individual countries in this dataset. 
 
Figure 3.4:  Historical Performance of Explanatory Variables by Country Grouping 
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Labor force dynamics are relatively similar, particularly the pattern of increasing 
labor force participation in services.  The lower wage countries also have, as expected, 
much higher labor force participation rates in agriculture at the start of the period, but 
across the board we observe a decline in this metric for both developed and emerging 
markets. 
Capital formation as a percent of GDP is also surprisingly similar across the 
groups.  This similarity will be noted again in examining the relative difference in capital 
formation as a driver of GDP/wage gaps in the different groups.  The unallocated 
markets and High Wage countries have on average the highest exports as a percent of 
GDP, although the unallocated markets have a more pronounced upward trend than the 
High Wage.  The Catching Up countries have a surprisingly flat trend for export shares, a 
fact that will be noted later in evaluating the regression results.   
An interesting aspect of the data in the Appendix table is the extent of within-
group variation, especially in the middle set of markets which correspond to the large 
convergence club 2 in the previous chapter.  It raises an important consideration, which 
is the potentially different path by which each country may reach a particular tier in the 
wage distribution.  In other words, one size does not fit all in explaining the forces for or 
against convergence in GDP and wages.  This issue will be addressed further in the 
analytical results with the application of country-specific coefficients and fixed effects.  
But at a high level, this observation suggests that the decomposition of this group into the 
Industrial Core and Catching Up markets may help to clarify the GDP/wage dynamics 




Section 6:  Regression Framework 
There are two estimation exercises undertaken in this section.  The first is a 
simple regression of manufacturing compensation on GDP per worker, to test for the 
presence of a GDP/wage gap and evaluate its size.  The second exercise is the estimation 
of causal factors for the GDP/wage gap.  These results are then interpreted within the HO 
multi-cone framework. 
As noted previously, in a Solow growth model steady state growth in wages and 
GDP should equalize.  In the context of a regression of wages on GDP, as in (1) below, 
this implies the coefficient on GDP should not be significantly different from 1.   
 
log(Manufacturing Compensation) = a + b log(GDP/worker) + μ  (1) 
 
The regression results in Table 3.1 show that this is not the case for the full 
sample.  GDP in this regression was calculated as GDP per labor force, to control for the 
effect of changing labor force participation rates on relative GDP performance.   
In the sample of 32 countries from the Bureau of Labor Statistics dataset, the 
coefficient on log(GDP) was 0.926 implying that compensation cost growth averages just 
93% of growth in GDP per capita.  This coefficient was significantly different from 1, 
with a t-statistic of 12.1. 
When the compensation cost convergence clubs from Chapter 2 are used as the 
basis for the regression, the resulting coefficients are very different across subgroups of 
this sample.  For the highest wage countries that made up the "High Wage" club, the 
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coefficient on GDP is not significantly different from 1.  However, among the Industrial 
Core group and the unallocated markets, the gap is statistically significant, with GDP 
growing more quickly than wages in both cases.  For the Catching Up markets, the 
coefficient is slightly greater than one, and it just meets the criteria for statistical 
significance at the 5% level (t-stat of 2.3 versus critical t-value of 2.04 with 30 degrees of 
freedom).  These results support the broad hypothesis that countries in different stages of 
development generate different economic outcomes, and in particular that the clubs 
identified in Chapter 2 do demonstrate some distinct characteristics.  However, stage of 
development is clearly not the only factor, as the Industrial Core countries have a larger 
GDP/wage gap than both the High Wage countries above them and the Catching Up 
countries below.  This suggests that there are economic characteristics beyond income 
level that differ across these identified groups.  This observation will be important when 
considering the explanatory factors for GDP/wage differentials in each set of markets. 
 









Full Sample 0.926 12.1 0.991
High Wage 1.000 0.0 0.989
Industrial Core 0.840 19.5 0.957
Catching Up 1.026 2.3 0.967
Unallocated Markets 0.805 12.9 0.990  
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The relationship between GDP per capita and wages can provide useful insights 
about the forces driving convergence, as pointed out by O'Rourke and Williamson (1999) 
and others.  For example, if migration is the key driver of convergence, then GDP per 
capita would rise more quickly than GDP per worker in countries receiving an influx of 
labor, and wage rates would fall relative to capital or land shares of income.  With 
technological advance driving convergence, returns to both labor and capital could rise.  
If trade is driving convergence, then the assumption of a single- or multiple-cone HO 
framework will have important implications for whether wages rise relative to expansion 
in GDP.  In this section, I will focus on a HO-based framework to address some of these 
questions.   
In contrast to studies that attempt to disaggregate trade data in order to identify 
evidence of specialization or factor content, I start with a broad characterization of a 
three-good HO model in which the goods in question correspond to three aggregated 
sectors of the economy:  agriculture, services, and manufacturing.  This broad 
decomposition has been utilized in previous theoretical and empirical trade studies, most 
notably Hertel (1997).  It can be justified, in part, by assuming labor is more mobile 
within a sector than across sectors. 
Such a construction, however, requires ranking the relative capital intensity of the 
three sectors.  Agriculture is ranked, without much debate, as the most labor-intensive.  
The service sector is often cited as being the next most labor-intensive, but this 
categorization is not entirely clear.  Many "cottage industry"-type service providers, such 
as barbers, lawn care services, and so on, would fit this conclusion.  But if we focus in 
particular on the tradable service sector as most relevant to this study, we have to 
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consider today's advanced professional service industries (such as radiology providers in 
health care) which make intensive use of computers and other high-cost equipment.  I 
will begin with an assumption of tradable services being the most capital-intensive. 
To establish an analytical framework that addresses some of these questions, it is 
first important to take into account the influence of changes in labor force participation 
on wages.  By using GDP per labor force in the GDP/wage variable on the left hand side 
of the equation, I have a proxy for overall productivity, as well as controlling for the 
effect of an increase in the supply of labor relative to the population, which would cause 
wages to grow more slowly than GDP per capita (i.e. the ratio of GDP to wages would 
increase).  This is a direct implication of the national accounts framework noted in 
Section 1.   
However, keeping in mind the three sector framework, other aspects of labor 
force participation may influence manufacturing wages.  The impact of a move of labor 
out of agriculture and into industry may be large enough for some markets, especially 
newly developing markets, to influence relative wages between the agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors.  Similarly, developed markets may be experiencing a move out of 
manufacturing and into service sectors that would be significant.  With a priori 
assumptions about the relative productivity in one sector versus another, growth theory 
provides some indication on the sign of these variables in our estimation, due to the 
effect such transitions would have on labor productivity in the industrial sector and for 
the economy overall.  For example, in the case of a transition from agriculture into 
manufacturing, we could expect productivity in the manufacturing sector to go down as 
these workers are incorporated into the labor force, due to training costs and a less 
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applicable skill set.  This would imply slower growth for manufacturing wages if 
workers are paid their marginal product.  At the same time, we would expect a net 
improvement in GDP per worker, as these workers are more productive in the 
manufacturing sector than they were in agriculture.  Both of these factors would suggest 
a negative sign on agricultural labor force participation, as overall productivity in the 
economy rises (higher GDP/worker) and productivity in manufacturing falls (lower 
wages). 
Capital formation is assumed to increase investment in industry in order to raise 
production, either via new investment capacity or technological improvements in 
production processes.  Through either increased demand for labor, or increased 
productivity of existing workers, these actions would tend to bid up wages.  As overall 
GDP/worker would also rise, the direction of the relationship between the GDP/wage 
ratio and capital formation is ambiguous. 
However, if we put these variables in the context of a three-sector HO model as 
described above, with all countries operating along their production frontier and some set 
of convergence clubs or "cones of specialization", the expected relationships between 
these variables becomes clearer.  Figure 3.5 repeats the diagram from Deardorff (2001) 
but with the three sector characterization imposed.  As a starting point, manufacturing 
has been ranked as the good of intermediate capital-intensity, but the conclusions are 
easily translated to an alternative ranking.  One possible alternative would be to use 
agriculture, labor-intensive manufactures and capital-intensive manufactures as the three 
sectors, building on the "export ladder" theories of trade and development.  Of course, by 
design this is an oversimplification, as any individual country does not, for example, 
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abandon agriculture by the time it achieves efficiency in the production of capital-
intensive manufactured goods.  But for purposes of examining macro-level data, these 
general characterizations may serve to capture the broad trends that are taking place over 
time and across countries. 
For countries in the lower cone in Figure 3.5, producing a mix of agricultural and 
manufactured products, adding capital will lead to an increased production of 
manufactured goods as the country moves toward a higher capital-labor ratio.  Output 
(and possibly exports) would increase as a result of the additional productive resources 
being utilized.  Labor force participation rates in agriculture might fall, but wages should 
remain unchanged, if the country remains within the FPE range of the cone (between 
endowments k1 and k2').  Thus the relationship between capital formation and 
GDP/wages becomes unambiguously positive for countries in this cone.  For countries in 
the upper cone, additional capital would increase the production of services, again with 
no change in wages, the relationship between capital formation and GDP/wages should 
be positive. 
Variables to capture trade-specific factors are also incorporated.  Under the 
standard comparative advantage result that a country exports the good it produces most 
efficiently, a rise in the export share of GDP should be associated with an increase in 
GDP per worker.  The sign on exports in the estimation, however, depends on the impact 
of increased trade on the denominator, wages.  Applying the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
that trade should benefit a country's abundant factor, we would expect wages to rise in 
tandem with GDP per worker if the country is labor-abundant relative to others in its 
cone.  This last part is important in the context of a multi-cone model, and I will return to 
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it in a moment.  If the country is capital-abundant, wages would not rise as quickly as 
GDP per worker, and the sign on exports would be unambiguously positive5.   
 
Figure 3.5: A Three-Sector Heckscher-Ohlin Model Illustrated 
  
 
                                                          
5 This conclusion would become more complicated if we tried to include a consideration of human capital 
embodied in the labor force.  Although the wage data capture only production workers in manufacturing, 
not management or other professional workers in the sector, it remains possible that there are differences in 
the degree of human capital embodied in the labor force across countries in the data set, based on 












Using the pooled time series/cross section data set described in Section 4, these 
elements are incorporated into the regression:  
 
log(GDP/worker) – log(ManfComp)  =   
β1 agr + β2 serv + β3 capital + β4 exports + μ     (2) 
 
where GDP/worker is nominal GDP per worker in USD; ManfComp is nominal USD 
hourly compensation costs in manufacturing; agr and serv are the shares of the total labor 
force in the agriculture and services sectors, respectively; capital is capital formation as a 
percent of GDP; exports is the export share of GDP; and μ is an error term 6. 
Given the cyclical momentum in GDP and compensation data, it is also 
appropriate to include time period dummies, to allow for potential serial correlation in 
the error term, μ, across periods.  These dummies are included for periods 1981-2005, 
but are not shown in (1) for ease of exposition. 
As in any panel data evaluation, once the variables of interest have been 
established it is necessary to consider the potential for fixed effects in the cross-section 
units, in this case, cross-country.  If countries are likely to have structurally different 
responses to any of the right hand side variables, omitting these fixed effects from the 
regression structure may generate biased estimates of their coefficients.  Alternatively, 
                                                          
6 An export value index was also included in preliminary model estimations to capture the presumed 
impact on wages of exporting higher value-added products.  This line of thinking is consistent with work 
estimating the factor content and productivity embedded in exports.  For example, Hausman, Hwang and 
Rodrik (2005) have shown that what they term the "income level" of a country's exports, measured by the 
relative productivity of traded goods, can affect subsequent growth.  However, the coefficient on this 
variable was highly insignificant, and it resulted in a loss of country data since several markets did not 
have data available for any time periods.  As a result, it was dropped in subsequent model runs. Foreign 
direct investment was also used in early iterations of the regression equation, but was insignificant in all 
cases.  Capital formation is a broader measure, capturing both externally financed capital (FDI) and 
domestically financed, so it appeared that FDI did not add material information to the results.   
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we may consider country-specific coefficients for some of the variables, which would 
take the place of country fixed effects if the variation in the variables is not large across 
countries and over time.  This feature of the panel data will be utilized in evaluating the 
regression results below. 
 
Section 7:  Regression Results 
The summary results from a preliminary analysis with cross-country fixed effects 
are shown in Table 3.2.  The full results, including country fixed effects and time dummy 
values, are shown in the Appendix.  The coefficient on service sector participation is 
negative and is significant, consistent with a move of less-productive service sector 
workers into manufacturing over time.7  The coefficient on agriculture participation is 
not significant.  This result likely is due to the relatively larger representation of 
developed markets in the full data sample, for which shifts out of agriculture already 
were completed in periods prior to this time series. 
Among the trade variables, exports and manufacturing exports both are positive 
and significant, indicating that production workers in manufacturing, on balance, do not 
capture a proportional share of the gains from trade.  Capital formation is also positive 
and significant, suggesting that wages do not benefit as much as overall productivity 
from additions to the capital stock.  These results are consistent with the data in Table 3.1, 
which showed GDP/worker for the full sample growing more quickly than 
manufacturing wages. 
 
                                                          
7 The sign on service sector participation may be positive if the shift taking place is toward greater 
employment in the more physical- and human-capital intensive service industries.  This possibility will be 
discussed in greater detail in the results for individual convergence clubs.  
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Table 3.2:  Regression Results Using Full Sample
Dependent Variable: log (GDP per capita/Manufacturing compensation costs)
Full Sample Results Significant
Coefficient t-Statistic Probability at 5% level
Constant 3.4154 73.3196 0.0000 y
Participation in Agriculture 0.0007 0.9088 0.3638 n
Participation in Service Sector -0.0029 -3.9542 0.0001 y
Capital Formation 0.0016 2.3083 0.0213 y
Exports 0.0017 8.0462 0.0000 y
Regression R-squared: 0.9346  
 
However, these aggregate results are difficult to interpret in a HO world, even a 
single-cone one, as labor in some (labor-abundant) countries should benefit from 
increased trade.  Again thinking of the results in Table 3.1, the countries in the Catching 
Up group (with wages growing slightly faster than GDP/worker in the aggregate) would 
appear to be a likely candidate for such a condition.  This observation points again in the 
direction of decomposing the full set of countries into appropriate sub-groupings for 
further analysis. 
 
Results for Convergence Clubs 
A central hypothesis of this chapter is that, if the convergence clubs identified in 
Chapter 2 can be taken to represent HO cones of specialization, then the direction and 
significance of the explanatory variables of the gap between GDP and wages may differ 
substantially across these groups.  The data in Table 3.1 did show a difference in the size 
of the GDP/wage gap among the groups, and not solely as a progression of income levels.  
This section will demonstrate that the impact of the explanatory variables in (1) also 
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differs in meaningful ways across the three identified convergence clubs and unallocated 
markets.8  A summary of the regression results by group is in Table 3.3. 
  
High Wage 
This club is composed of seven northern European countries, with the highest 
nominal wage rates among the four identified groups.   
The coefficients on both agriculture and service sector participation are negative 
and significant, but with the coefficient on agricultural participation almost twice as large 
as service sector participation in influencing manufacturing wages relative to GDP 
growth.  This outcome is surprising, and may be due to the offsetting effects of low- and 
high-productivity workers within the service sector.  As lower productivity workers leave 
service sector employment and move into manufacturing, overall economic productivity 
should rise, while productivity in the manufacturing sector may fall due to the influx of 
less-skilled workers.  This generates the observed negative coefficient on service sector 
participation rates.  By contrast, if labor force participation rates are rising in the service 
sector due to the expansion of highly productive, physical and human capital intensive 
industries, overall economic productivity could rise more quickly than productivity in the 
manufacturing sector, leading to a positive relationship between service sector 
employment and the GDP/wage gap for manufacturing workers.  This effect would be an 
offset to the negative sign on service sector participation.  The smaller coefficient, also 
by about half, on services versus agricultural participation rates is observed for the 
Industrial Core group as well. 
                                                          
8 The fourth club, composed of Hong Kong and Taiwan, is not shown in this analysis as the World Bank 
does not publish country data for Taiwan.  Hong Kong is grouped with the unallocated markets for 
purposes of this section. 
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Table 3.3:  Regression Results by Convergence Club
Dependent Variable: log (GDP per capita/Manufacturing compensation costs)
High Wage Significant
Coefficient t-Statistic Probability at 5% level
Constant 3.9470 50.4381 0.0000 y
Participation in Agriculture -0.0115 -4.2697 0.0000 y
Participation in Service Sector -0.0064 -5.6212 0.0000 y
Capital Formation -0.0001 -0.0629 0.9499 n
Exports 0.0008 1.2743 0.2050 n
Regression R-squared  0.8627
Industrial Core Significant
Coefficient t-Statistic Probability at 5% level
Constant 3.3648 41.1540 0.0000 y
Participation in Agriculture -0.0068 -4.4437 0.0000 y
Participation in Service Sector -0.0034 -2.3393 0.0203 y
Capital Formation 0.0063 11.1137 0.0000 y
Exports 0.0015 4.2992 0.0000 y
Regression R-squared:  0.9404
Catching Up Significant
Coefficient t-Statistic Probability at 5% level
Constant 3.0556 9.3092 0.0000 y
Participation in Agriculture 0.0036 1.5375 0.1267 n
Participation in Service Sector -0.0029 -0.8182 0.4148 n
Capital Formation -0.0002 -0.1928 0.8474 n
Exports 0.0020 2.2238 0.0280 y
Regression R-squared:  0.7972
Unallocated Markets Significant
Coefficient t-Statistic Probability at 5% level
Constant 3.3764 80.6711 0.0000 y
Participation in Agriculture -0.0051 -3.3112 0.0013 y
Participation in Service Sector 0.0025 1.6617 0.0998 n
Capital Formation 0.0086 8.3877 0.0000 y
Exports -0.0007 -3.1352 0.0023 y
Regression R-squared:  0.9839  
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The negative sign on these labor force coefficients is not inconsistent with a 
position within a cone of specialization for these markets.  However, the other results 
point in a different direction.  Capital formation and exports are not significant influences 
on the GDP/wage gap for this group, indicating that manufacturing wages rise at a 
comparable rate to GDP/worker in response to increased trade and to capital stock 
expansion.  This outcome is consistent with the outcome for this group in Table 3.1, 
which showed a coefficient not significantly different from 1 in a regression of wages on 
GDP/worker, and suggests that wage growth is not fixed in this group.  Thus, the bulk of 
the evidence points to this group being in transition outside of a Heckscher-Ohlin cone of 
specialization, as factor price equalization does not appear to be locking in wage growth. 
 
Industrial Core 
For this group, which includes developed markets such as the U.S., Canada, UK 
and other major European markets, the results in Table 3.1 showed a coefficient on 
GDP/worker that was less than 1.  Thus, we may have an initial hypothesis that these 
countries are within an HO cone of specialization, where wage growth is fixed and does 
not rise in tandem with GDP/worker. 
All of the explanatory variables in regression (2) are significant for this group, 
and support this initial hypothesis.  The coefficients on agricultural and service sector 
participation rates demonstrate the same relationship as described for the High Wage 
markets above.  The significant negative signs on labor force participation rates for both 
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of these sectors indicate that, as labor is being allocated to its most productive uses, GDP 
rises but wages may be fixed by the forces of factor price equalization. 
The sign on capital formation is positive, also consistent with a position within an 
HO cone, where increases in capital formation drive higher GDP growth, while wages 
remain fixed by FPE. 
The sign on exports is positive, indicating that wage earners do not capture the 
benefits from increased trade.  Again, if these countries sit within an HO cone, the 
benefits from trade should accrue to the abundant factor under Stopler-Samuelson 
conditions.  Thus, we can conclude that these markets are relatively capital abundant 
compared to other trading partners within the cone. 
 
Catching Up 
This group of markets includes a geographically diverse group of newly-
industrialized nations, from Spain and Ireland in Western Europe, to Singapore and 
Korea in Asia-Pacific, and Israel and Greece on the Mediterranean.  For this group, the 
signs on the labor force participation rates and capital formation were not significant, 
indicating either that manufacturing wages are growing in tandem with GDP/worker for 
changes in these variables, or that the movements in these variables over time were not 
large enough to generate a significant coefficient. 
The only variable that does enter with significance in the regression equation is 
the export share.  This result is surprising for this group, given that the Catching Up 
markets demonstrated strong wage growth in manufacturing, with a coefficient slightly 
greater than 1 on log(GDP/worker) in Table 3.1.  It seems that manufacturing wages are 
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benefitting during the transition period for these countries, though not directly from 
increased trade.  It is notable that the R-squared for the regression on these markets is 
much lower than for any other group, also suggesting less overall explanatory power of 
Equation 1 to capture the reasons for the GDP/wage gap for this group of countries. 
Returning to the consideration of HO cones of specialization, there are two ways 
to characterize the regression results.  The first potential explanation is that these 
countries are in the same cone of diversification with the Industrial Core group, but at the 
lower end; that is, they are labor abundant relative to the other members of the group.  
This would explain the relative strength of manufacturing wages relative to GDP/worker, 
as wages move in the direction of FPE with the more developed markets of the Industrial 
Core.  But it is inconsistent with the positive sign on the export variable.  It could be that, 
in the early stages of development, domestic demand for manufactured goods is growing 
so strongly in these markets that it absorbs goods that would otherwise be exported, thus 
skewing the results for the export variable.  This conjecture is supported by the data in 
Figure 3.4, which showed a relatively flat export share of GDP for these markets as 
compared with all three of the other groups.   
An alternative explanation is that these markets are moving along a path between 
two cones, possibly on the cusp of joining the Industrial Core in that cone of 
specialization, so that they have not yet achieved the optimal capital-labor allocation 
between sectors and factor price equalization.  This conclusion would be broadly 
consistent with the lack of significance in the coefficients on capital formation and labor 
force participation.  It is also worth noting that these markets weakly passed the 
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convergence test in Chapter 2, and thus could have been grouped as a single convergence 
club with the industrial core. 
Based on these mixed results, it is plausible to conclude that this group of 
markets was in the process of transitioning between cones to join the Industrial Core 
countries sometime during the period covered by this study.  Follow-up evaluation of this 
group of markets in the future with a longer time series could confirm this conjecture. 
 
Unallocated Markets 
This group is composed of lower-wage emerging markets including Brazil and 
Mexico in Latin America, Sri Lanka and Singapore in Asia, and Eastern European 
markets such as Hungary and the Czech Republic.  These markets did not form a 
convergence club in terms of wage growth, and so it may be inappropriate to attempt to 
represent them as a diversification cone.  In addition, several of the markets have 
truncated data availability, from just the mid-1990s onward, so the comparison with the 
other market groups is not completely parallel.  However, the estimation of equation 1 
does represent a fairly good fit based on the regression R-squared, so the coefficients 
may still give some information regarding the influence of trade on GDP growth and 
wages in these markets. 
Agricultural sector participation has a negative coefficient and is significant, 
consistent with expectations, but the service sector participation rate was not significant 
for these markets.  Although the underlying data in Figure 3.4 do show a trend toward 
rising service sector participation in these markets, the same as for the other three groups, 
there may not be sufficient flows of labor between services and manufacturing to enter 
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into the estimation with significance.  This also suggests that these markets may be in an 
HO cone where trade is concentrated between the Agriculture and Manufacturing sectors, 
with service sector activity still focused on non-tradable services. 
The capital formation variable was positive and significant for these markets, 
consistent with growing GDP and fixed wages as we would see within an HO cone.  The 
sign on exports was negative and significant, indicating that the benefits from trade 
accrue to labor in these markets, consistent with labor-abundant endowments. 
Table 3.4 provides a summary of the conclusions for each group of markets in the 
context of the multi-cone Heckscher-Ohlin framework.  While not all of the results are 
conclusive, in particular the mixed results for the Catching Up markets, it is apparent that 
there are different dynamics at work for each of the country groups with regard to GDP, 
wages, capital-labor allocation and trade.  These dynamics appear to be quite consistent 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Studies examining the effect of trade on wages generally use two types of 
measures of trade openness.  The first is export volume, similar to the regressions above.  
The second common approach is to use a policy-based measure of trade openness.  Such 
measures are usually based on a point in time, or have very limited time series 
availability.  Since many cross-country studies of the impact of trade on growth or wages 
are static, rather than dynamic, they are able to incorporate such time-insensitive 
characteristics in their estimation.  That is a limitation in the dynamic approach used 
here.9 
However, recognizing that the results above may be better informed by 
understanding domestic labor market conditions, as well as trade policy, data from the 
World Bank "Doing Business" survey and the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal 
"Index of Economic Freedom" were collected for evaluation.  These surveys each cover 
over 180 countries and provide measures of the business and policy environment in the 
areas of legal protections, regulation, and social conditions.  The Appendix shows these 
rankings in detail.  It is interesting to note, among the 181 countries covered in the World 
Bank survey, all but one of the countries covered in this study fall in the top half of 
countries with regard to trade flexibility (the lowest being Brazil ranked at 92). 
                                                          
9 It may be possible to include one time-invariant dummy variable if we can eliminate the country fixed 
effects.  This can be done if one or more of the other explanatory variables have limited variation across 
countries and over time, thus taking on the role of a country fixed effect in the regression estimation. 
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This observation makes the positive coefficients on the export variables in 
regression (2) even more striking, as it suggests that growth in trade does not benefit 
manufacturing workers in the Industrial Core and Catching Up countries.10 
The rankings for ease of employing workers vary much more widely, with 16 of 
the 31 countries in the sample falling in the bottom half of countries globally.  These 
countries are shown in Table 3.5, and include a selection of markets from the highest and 
lowest wage groups.  The rankings are not significantly different using data from the 
Heritage index. 
 
Table 3.5:  Selected Data from World Bank Survey of Labor Conditions 
 
Unfortunately, these annual survey data go back less than a decade, and so it is 
not possible to include them in the regression equation or compare results over time.  
                                                          
10 This conclusion applies only to hourly production workers, on which the data are based.  It may be that 
non-production workers in manufacturing (management, other professionals) do benefit from expanded 
trade.  It also does not parse out which parties benefit from the returns to capital.   Production workers may 
also be stockholders in their companies, for example. 


















Higher number implies less 
flexible labor market 
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Further work with this variable might be of use when considering the relative over-
performance of manufacturing wages in the High Wage countries relative to the 
Industrial Core, as noted previously.    
 
Section 8:  Examination of Country Fixed Effects 
Another aspect of the regression results that may help clarify the existence and 
composition of convergence clubs, or cones of specialization in the HO framework, are 
the country fixed effects.  In the context of the current model, the fixed effects capture 
the country-specific influences on the GDP/wage gap.  Looking at the results from the 
full sample regression, we might expect to see the fixed effects ranked from highest to 
lowest wage countries, and grouped according to the convergence clubs.  Table 3.6 
shows that this is not the case.  The fixed effects themselves, in this formulation, also do 
not show a consistent pattern.  Countries having positive fixed effects include members 
of all four convergence clubs, ranging from Norway, a member of the highest wage 
group, to Japan from the Industrial Core group, and Poland from the unallocated group. 
Although this result may not make sense in a single-cone HO model, it is not 
necessarily inconsistent with a multi-cone world.  If what matters for the GDP/wage gap 
is a country's position relative to others within its diversification cone, then the 
dispersion of country fixed effects in the full sample may mask a pattern of relationships 
within countries in the various cones.  The lines in Table 3.6 show that the ranking of 
country fixed effects are relatively unchanged when moving from the full sample 
estimation to the four group-specific ones. The exception to the preservation of rankings 
is the High Wage group, where Norway moves substantially, and the fixed effects for the 
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other markets in this group are so closely clustered that small changes affect the rankings 
materially. 
Table 3.6: Tracking of Fixed Effects Ranking from Full Sample to Individual Group Estimations
Fixed Effect Fixed Effect
BELGIUM--C -0.1525 NETH--C -0.0587
PHIL--C -0.1434 BELGIUM--C -0.0192
AUSTRIA--C -0.1319 NORWAY--C -0.0157
BRAZIL--C -0.1276 DENMARK--C -0.0067
NETH--C -0.1234 SWEDEN--C -0.0017
FINLAND--C -0.1114 AUSTRIA--C 0.0006
SWEDEN--C -0.1015 SWITZ--C 0.0849
ITALY--C -0.0704
IRELAND--C -0.0700 FINLAND--C -0.0817
SWITZ--C -0.0683 ITALY--C -0.0439
SPAIN--C -0.0591 CANADA--C -0.0379
DENMARK--C -0.0551 UK--C -0.0246
CANADA--C -0.0524 JAPAN--C -0.0090
KOREA--C -0.0432 IRELAND--C -0.0024
UK--C -0.0297 FRANCE--C 0.0434
CZECH--C -0.0252 US--C 0.0508
POLAND--C -0.0142 AUSTRALIA--C 0.0707
SRILANKA--C 0.0006 LUX--C 0.1222
JAPAN--C 0.0106
SING--C 0.0179 KOREA--C -0.2305
FRANCE--C 0.0215 SING--C -0.1403
NORWAY--C 0.0267 SPAIN--C -0.1326
HUNGARY--C 0.0301 PORT--C -0.0532
US--C 0.0459 ISRAEL--C -0.0189
AUSTRALIA--C 0.0654 GREECE--C 0.1460
PORT--C 0.0712 NZ--C 0.3218
NZ--C 0.0913
GREECE--C 0.1068 BRAZIL--C -0.3133
LUX--C 0.1217 CZECH--C -0.1983
ISRAEL--C 0.1218 HUNGARY--C -0.1542
MEXICO--C 0.2260 POLAND--C -0.1307
HK--C 0.2464 PHIL--C -0.0479
SRILANKA--C 0.0671
Lines for the unallocated markets are omitted for clarity, MEXICO--C 0.1004
but only Hungary and the Philippines change rank by more HK--C 0.1835
than one position.  
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It is also worth noting that the country fixed effects are, in general, quite small 
relative to the size of the regression coefficients, averaging just 2.4% of the regression 
coefficient value in the full sample case.  Eliminating them, however, substantially 
reduces the regression R-squared, for example from 0.93 to just 0.46 in the full sample 
case.  Given the relatively small variation in some of the right hand side variables in the 
estimation, it is likely that these fixed effects, though small, are capturing important 
information about time-insensitive country characteristics such as land mass and 
geographic location that are often found to be significant in static examinations of the 
trade-income relationship. 
 
Section 9:  Conclusions and Areas for Further Research 
The regression results in this chapter lend further support to the view that key 
conclusions of the HO model are supported by the available data, as interpreted within 
the context of a multiple cone model.  In particular, with the groupings of markets that 
demonstrated evidence of convergence in Chapter 2, this chapter provides additional 
support to the identified clubs by demonstrating significant differences in the interaction 
between GDP growth, wages and the explanatory variables.  It is noteworthy that these 
effects can be identified even using broad macroeconomic data, and a generic three-
sector trade model.   Further research to meld this analytical approach with more 
narrowly defined groupings of sectors and industries may help to clarify the results even 
further. 
This chapter also speaks to some aspects of the trade and inequality debate, to the 
extent that production workers in manufacturing seem, on average, to capture less of the 
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benefit from trade than overall economic growth benchmarks.  This result is not solely 
observed among the developed markets, and in fact appears most prominently for the two 
middle wage groups.  The results for the High Wage countries and the lowest wage 
group of unallocated markets do not demonstrate this effect.  This distinction may 



































6 Hong Kong SAR 6.8%
7 Hungary 7.3%
8 Czech Republic 9.4%
9 Portugal 5.3% 7.4% 1.7 13.3
10 Singapore 7.8%
11 Israel 6.2%
12 New Zealand 4.9%
13 Korea, Republic of 13.1%
14 Greece 7.5%
15 Spain 6.7%
16 Japan 6.4% 5.6% 4.8 25.7






23 United Kingdom 7.0%
24 Luxembourg 4.9%
25 Finland 5.9%






32 Norway 5.9%  
 
Ranked from lowest to highest compensation costs in 2006 



























































   





   
























   





   




























   




























   

























   














































































































































































































































   







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Full Sample Results of Regression Equation 1
Dependent Variable: log (GDP per capita/Manufacturing compensation costs)
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 1980 2005
Cross-sections included: 32
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 692
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 3.4154 0.0466 73.3196 0.0000
AGR? 0.0007 0.0008 0.9088 0.3638
SERV? -0.0029 0.0007 -3.9542 0.0001
CAP? 0.0016 0.0007 2.3083 0.0213
EXP? 0.0017 0.0002 8.0462 0.0000
EXPMANF? 0.0019 0.0003 5.5859 0.0000
YR1981 0.0029 0.0025 1.1460 0.2522
YR1982 -0.0009 0.0025 -0.3504 0.7262
YR1983 0.0086 0.0043 2.0121 0.0446
YR1984 0.0136 0.0041 3.3102 0.0010
YR1985 0.0182 0.0046 3.9345 0.0001
YR1986 0.0221 0.0052 4.2760 0.0000
YR1987 0.0261 0.0060 4.3548 0.0000
YR1988 0.0284 0.0056 5.0917 0.0000
YR1989 0.0308 0.0054 5.6769 0.0000
YR1990 0.0271 0.0055 4.9144 0.0000
YR1991 0.0266 0.0068 3.8957 0.0001
YR1992 0.0286 0.0081 3.5205 0.0005
YR1993 0.0331 0.0090 3.6847 0.0002
YR1994 0.0335 0.0090 3.7289 0.0002
YR1995 0.0405 0.0089 4.5564 0.0000
YR1996 0.0393 0.0092 4.2481 0.0000
YR1997 0.0398 0.0092 4.3383 0.0000
YR1998 0.0381 0.0096 3.9626 0.0001
YR1999 0.0407 0.0098 4.1496 0.0000
YR2000 0.0462 0.0098 4.7232 0.0000
YR2001 0.0464 0.0103 4.4954 0.0000
YR2002 0.0516 0.0113 4.5681 0.0000
YR2003 0.0465 0.0118 3.9443 0.0001
YR2004 0.0490 0.0121 4.0602 0.0001
YR2005 0.0589 0.0119 4.9584 0.0000
Fixed Effects (Cross)
_AUSTRALIA--C 0.065381 _LUX--C 0.121662
_AUSTRIA--C -0.13191 _MEXICO--C 0.226019
_BELGIUM--C -0.15249 _NETH--C -0.12339
_BRAZIL--C -0.1276 _NZ--C 0.091256
_CANADA--C -0.05243 _NORWAY--C 0.026747
_CZECH--C -0.0252 _PHIL--C -0.14339
_DENMARK--C -0.05514 _POLAND--C -0.0142
_FINLAND--C -0.11143 _PORT--C 0.071241
_FRANCE--C 0.021515 _SING--C 0.01788
_GREECE--C 0.106751 _SPAIN--C -0.05905
_HK--C 0.246382 _SRILANKA-- 0.000587
_HUNGARY--C 0.030091 _SWEDEN--C -0.10146
_IRELAND--C -0.06997 _SWITZ--C -0.0683
_ISRAEL--C 0.121753 _UK--C -0.02975
_ITALY--C -0.07038 _US--C 0.045924
_JAPAN--C 0.010575
_KOREA--C -0.04323
R-squared 0.9346     Mean dependent var 3.512614
Adjusted R-squared 0.928268     S.D. dependent var 0.134961
S.E. of regression 0.036146     Akaike info criterion -3.71715
Sum squared resid 0.823137     Schwarz criterion -3.31043
Log likelihood 1348.134     F-statistic 147.5912
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Section 1:  Motivation for the Study 
As noted in Chapter 2, Mexico is a relative outlier in terms of compensation cost 
performance in recent decades.  The markets in the BLS compensation cost dataset 
demonstrated average annual cost growth of 3.4% over the 1975-2006 period, while 
nominal manufacturing compensation in Mexico averaged just 2.1% annual growth.  As 
compared to the other low-wage markets in the dataset the performance gap is even 
wider, with average annual compensation cost growth of 4.2% for the unallocated 
markets with which Mexico was grouped in the analysis.  Mexico's cost growth was, in 
fact, the slowest of any single country for which data were available for the full 30-year 
period (Brazil, with data from 1996 onward, was the only slower-growing market).  
Mexico began the period near the top of the lower tier of markets, but fell toward the 
bottom of the group by 2006, displaced by countries in Eastern Europe and Asia.  
Mexico fell in the country rankings by 7 positions; it may be worth noting that only the 
U.S. fell by a greater distance over this period (down 10 positions). 
The phenomenon of Mexico's stagnating growth has not been ignored in the 
economic literature, but most studies of Mexico have compared it with other Latin 
American markets or the NAFTA countries.  Considering the importance of country 
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groupings identified in the preceding two chapters, this paper looks at a different 
relationship to address this question.  Popular publications have noted China as a key 
threat to jobs everywhere from the U.S. and Europe to Asia and Latin America.  The 
economic literature has also begun to address this question more rigorously.  This 
chapter adds to this growing strand of the literature by examining the influence of China 
on Mexico, and specifically on Mexican wages, through Chinese import competition in 
Mexico's biggest export destination, the U.S. 
Lack of time series data on many macroeconomic variables for China, notably 
wage costs, may have limited the ability of researchers to address this question to date.  
This paper uses an indirect approach to estimating the influence of lower Chinese wages 
on Mexican wages, by taking a combination of industry-level compensation data for 
Mexico (available from 1992-2006 for 22 industry groups) and industry-level data on 
U.S. trade with both Mexico and China.  This approach allows for an exploration of 
overall trends in Mexican wages, as well as identifying key sectors which may be 
influencing the overall results.   
A second relevant strand of the literature is the study of intra-industry trade (IIT), 
especially that portion of IIT generated by "outsourcing" or "offshoring" activities.  Most 
of the studies to date on Chinese import competition have looked at trade shares without 
consideration of this phenomenon.  Given the prominence of maquiladora industries in 
Mexico's manufacturing sector over this period, as well as work on IIT by Feenstra and 
Hansen (2001) showing that outsourcing may widen the skilled-unskilled wage gap, it 
may be necessary to control for this type of activity when estimating China's influence 
on Mexican wages. 
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The analysis in this paper does show evidence of increased Chinese import 
penetration in the U.S. putting downward pressure on Mexican wage growth in some key 
manufacturing industries.  However, the impact is considerably less widespread, in terms 
of the number of sectors influenced, when the high level of IIT between Mexico and the 
U.S. is accounted for.  Further, the hypothesis in Feenstra and Hansen that outsourcing is 
detrimental to unskilled labor in the country to which production is outsourced is only 
partially supported, with several sectors demonstrating a positive relationship between 
wages and IIT. 
 
Section 2 – Mexico's Economic and Wage Growth in Global Perspective 
This section presents some of the key facts regarding Mexico's often-cited 
economic underperformance, even among other emerging markets.  While Mexico has 
experienced a series of devaluations and debt crises in the past, so have markets such as 
Chile, Brazil, Russia, and a wide group of Asian markets in the wake of that region's 
1997 financial crisis.  Most of these markets are not considered economic 
underperformers, despite the near-term impacts of their respective crises.  Several of 
these markets also share Mexico's reliance on a commodity-export base, and the resulting 
tendency for boom-bust cycles of economic growth associated with the volatility in 
global commodity prices. 
Mexico's real GDP growth has fallen short of a (non-weighted) average of 
selected developed and developing global markets in the last three decades, by 0.8 
percentage points in real local currency terms from 1982 through 2006.11,12  However, as 
                                                          
11 In nominal USD terms, Mexico's GDP averaged 1.8 percentage points lower than the same world 
average over 1982-2006. 
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Figure 4.1 illustrates, that weak average performance is influenced by the severe 
recessions induced by currency devaluations and external debt crises, notably in 1982 
and 1994, and the global collapse in commodity prices in 1986-87.  Since the 1994 
currency devaluation, Mexico has largely avoided such crises, and economic growth has 
tracked more closely to the sample average. 
Growth in manufacturing labor compensation in Mexico, however, has lagged 
behind the average for the same set of global markets by 2.4 percentage points.  This 
development was illustrated in the GDP/wage gaps in Chapter 3, which showed Mexico's 
average growth in GDP per capita at twice the rate of growth of labor compensation 
costs over 1976-2006, the biggest gap for any developed or developing market in the 
data set other than Sri Lanka (and excluding the truncated 10-year data set for Brazil). 
 














                                                                                                                                                                            
12 The World Average used here comprises the 34 countries in the BLS dataset on labor compensation 
costs.  This construction is used to ensure comparability of the measures presented in this section with the 
results of the regression analysis later in this paper.  The countries are listed in Section 1 of the Appendix. 
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Over the 15-year time span to be studied in this paper, the growth in 
compensation in Mexico has averaged -0.9% in real local currency terms, as compared 
with 1.5% growth for the sample average.13  Figure 4.2 shows indexed historical 
compensation cost data in both real and nominal USD terms, comparing Mexico to the 
rest-of-world sample as a whole and with the other low-wage markets in the sample, 
primarily in Eastern Europe and Asia.14  In addition to the weaker cost growth over the 
period, Mexico's compensation cost growth has also been somewhat countercyclical, 
particularly in nominal USD terms, as compared to the rest-of-world average.  One 
possible reason for this is the relationship of oil prices to Mexico's economic 
performance as an oil exporter relative to the rest of the countries in this dataset, mostly 
importers of oil.  Oil price spikes would be correlated with periods of weak growth for 
other global economies, but strong performance for Mexico and vice versa when prices 
crash.  Time period dummies in our estimation should at least partially control for this 
issue, assuming no disproportionate effects of oil prices across different sub-sectors of 
Mexican manufacturing.  In addition, oil as a share of Mexican exports has declined over 
time, from about 80% in 1980 to just around 10% by the mid-2000s, which seems to 





                                                          
13 In nominal local currency terms, the measure to be used in this paper as a measure of the cost foreign 
firms face in sourcing production to Mexico (shown later in Table 2) the difference is similar, with Mexico 
growing just 1.6% and the rest of the sample 3.4%.  This is a gap of -1.8 points versus -2.4 points in real 
local currency terms. 
14 Low-wage markets in this calculation are Brazil, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Israel, Korea, 
Singapore, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Taiwan. 
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*Average of all markets covered in BLS sample
 










*Average of all markets covered in BLS sample  
 
An additional consideration in examining manufacturing wage performance 
specifically is the relative importance of the manufacturing sector in the Mexican 
economy compared with other world markets.   Figure 4.3 shows the development of 
manufacturing value-added as a percent of GDP for Mexico and the world average.  It 
shows Mexico had a relatively high manufacturing share in the periods following major 
peso devaluations (1987 and 1994), but on average has followed a declining trend similar 
to the rest of the world.  Thus, manufacturing wage performance does not appear to be 
related to a disproportionate manufacturing sector presence in the Mexican economy. 
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Mexico's economic and political history has certainly played a part in generating 
these outcomes, as well as its unique (among emerging markets, but shared with Canada) 
geographical proximity to the U.S. market. 
With regard to aggregate wage growth, macro trends were emerging over these 
decades that also contributed to Mexico's wage stagnation.  In addition to policy efforts 
to suppress nominal wage growth and inflation following the 1994 peso crisis, Mexico 
faced a significant expansion of the labor supply due to the maturation of a baby boom 
generation born during the peak growth years of the 1970s, which began entering the 
labor force in the 1990s.  As well, female labor force participation increased due to 
cultural trends as well as the need to support family incomes during the 1980 and 1990 
economic crises.  On net, the labor force was expanding by about 1 million individuals 
per year by the time NAFTA was implemented in the mid-1990s (Polaski, 2004). 
The issue of wage differentials is addressed in Hansen (2003) as it relates to the 
relative skill mix of Mexican labor since NAFTA.  Hansen concludes that wage 
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dispersion in Mexico has increased since NAFTA, and that regional differences in access 
to FDI and migration have also contributed to the aggregate result.  Polaski also points 
out that, even for workers with university degrees, real wages fell between 1993 and 
2000.  Labor productivity growth is not a likely explanation for falling real wages, as 
productivity has been relatively robust over this period.  Manufacturing productivity rose 
by nearly 60% from 1993 to 2003, while wages declined in real terms from the beginning 
to the end of this period.   
For purposes of this paper, the contribution of export activity to Mexican wage 
growth is of particular relevance.  Since 1982, Mexico's manufacturing exports have 
expanded rapidly, supported by a process of trade liberalization and attraction of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI).  From 1982 to 2004, according to the World Bank, Mexico 
received $200 billion in FDI from the U.S. alone, about half its total FDI over this period 
and up to 20% of its gross capital formation. These investments were concentrated in the 
manufacturing sector including, but not limited to, the developing maquiladora sector.  
Mexico's non-oil exports grew an average annual 13.4% over this period. 
Despite this rapid expansion of export activity, Palma (2005) and others point out 
that Mexico's macro economy in general, and its manufacturing sector in particular, have 
seen limited benefit.  Palma cites the deceleration of GDP growth in the period following 
trade liberalization, from a nearly 9% annual rate in 1970-1981 to just 2% in the 
following two decades.  Employment growth, wage growth and manufacturing activity 
all decelerated.  While some of this decline can be attributed to more conservative policy 
management, particularly the inflation-fighting policies instituted after the 1994 peso 
101 
crisis, there does seem to be evidence that the rise in exports in recent decades 
contributed less to Mexico's real GDP and wage growth than in earlier periods. 
Polaski also points out that the structure of Mexico's export industries and, to 
some extent, government currency policy to maintain a weak peso, encouraged the 
location of final assembly operations in Mexico with extensive use of imported 
components.  This was the central premise of the maquiladora manufacturing program, 
for example.  This structure meant that final assembly export operations did not generate 
significant spillovers to the domestic supply chain.  Imported components may be a 
significant difference with respect to China, which had protections for domestic industry 
and a higher domestic content of supply chain.15  China also encouraged FDI projects to 
enhance technology sharing and improve infrastructure and raw material capacity, as 
well as promoting export-oriented FDI (Long, 2005). 
A full study of the differences between Mexican and Chinese FDI policies is 
beyond the scope of the current paper.  But such policy differences likely had an 
influence on the significantly different outcomes that can be observed with regard to 
intra-industry trade for each country with the U.S.  
 
Section 3 – The Influence of Intra-Industry Trade 
As noted above, an additional consideration regarding Mexican manufacturing 
wages is that Mexico is relatively open to imported components, both through the 
maquiladora sector and in its manufacturing activities in general, so that the expansion of 
                                                          
15 Although some of the local-content restrictions had to be abandoned for China's WTO accession in 2001, 
these policies would have been in place for most of the period studied in this paper.  Further, the domestic 
content of exported production remained high even after WTO entry.  Long (2005) points out that the two 
different models of processing trade, PTI (processing trade using imported materials) and PTS (using 
materials supplied by clients), saw the domestic content of Chinese exports rise from 17.3% and 18.5% 
respectively in 1993 to 23.3% and 31.4% by 2003. 
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trade actually may have dampened wage growth for production workers in Mexico by 
reducing net demand for labor across the supply chain.  This assertion runs somewhat 
counter to standard trade theory, which would suggest that opening a market such as 
Mexico to trade should benefit low-skilled labor in the labor-abundant trading partner.   
However, Hanson and Harrison (1999) note that Mexican tariff reductions in the 
1984-90 trade liberalization period were largest in the most labor-intensive sectors of the 
Mexican economy.  They assert that, if trade protection was initially higher in labor-
intensive sectors, and if these tariff changes were passed through to goods prices, then 
Stolper-Samuelson effects would suggest an increase in the relative wage of skilled labor.  
They also note that this observation does not hold in the subsequent, post-NAFTA period, 
however, where larger tariff reductions took place in skill-intensive sectors.   
The literature on intra-industry trade may provide some additional insights into 
why expanded trade might have dampened Mexican wage growth in the post-NAFTA 
period.  The IIT literature focuses most often on outsourcing of production, and on 
skilled and unskilled wage differentials in the developed markets from which production 
is transferred.  For example, Feenstra and Hansen (2001) present a model that 
demonstrates that trade in intermediate inputs (i.e. outsourcing) may have the same 
impact of widening the skilled-unskilled wage gap as skill-biased technological change.  
Slaughter (2001) also addresses this question for the U.S., focusing on elasticity of 
production and nonproduction labor in specific sectors.  He found that demand for 
production labor, assumed to represent less-skilled labor, became more elastic in 
industries with more outsourcing and with more technological change, as measured by 
investment in computers and other high-tech capital.  Campa and Goldberg (1997) 
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addressed this question for a set of developed markets and manufacturing subsectors 
(including the U.S., Canada, U.K. and Japan). 
Fewer papers have looked at these questions for the emerging markets to which 
production is transferred.  However, intra-industry trade may have a dampening effect on 
wages in the destination country as well.  Feenstra and Hansen (1997) note that, in a case 
where firms outsource their least skill-intensive production to a labor-abundant country, 
the average skill intensity and therefore the premium to skilled wages may rise in both 
the source and destination countries.  This would occur if the less-skill intensive 
production being outsourced is nonetheless more skill-intensive than the average in the 
labor-abundant country.  Supporting this hypothesis, they find that 45% of the increase in 
Mexico's nonproduction wage share of manufacturing over 1975-88 was due to 
production moving into foreign-owned assembly plants, taken as a proxy for outsourced 
production. 
For China and Hong Kong, Hsieh and Woo (1999) find that 45-60% of the 
increase in nonproduction wage share for Hong Kong manufacturing industries can be 
attributed to outsourcing of manufacturing to China.  However, they do not address the 
impact on wages in the destination country, i.e. China. 
It is important to note that the theoretical results regarding IIT and unskilled 
wages are not unambiguous.  First, the conclusions are primarily developed based on 
outsourcing activities; however, not all IIT is outsourcing.  But for developing countries 
like Mexico the data are not detailed enough to permit detailed estimates of outsourcing 
as a subset of total intra-industry trade.  This paper has some advantage in that area, as 
the trading partners in question are Mexico and the U.S.  We can utilize the existing 
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evidence on outsourcing of production for the U.S. manufacturing activities in these 
sectors to make some inferences about whether a high IIT ratio for Mexico represents 
outsourcing.  Further, there is fairly robust evidence that foreign-owned firms pay higher 
wages (for example, Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey, 1997 and Brown, Deardorff and Stern, 
2004) although there is only limited evidence that this flows through to aggregate wage 
levels in the host country.  However, at the disaggregated level, this effect might be large 
enough to support higher wages in a particular sector or region where foreign ownership 
is most intensive. 
To explore whether intra-industry trade helps explain the stagnation in Mexican 
manufacturing wages, data were gathered on exports to, and imports from, the U.S. for 
both Mexico and China, and for the U.S. with the world as a whole.  These data were 
used to construct an index of intra-industry trade for each country and manufacturing 
sub-sector.  The index takes a value of 0 when no intra-industry trade is present, and 100 
if all trade is intra-industry.16  These data are summarized in Table 4.1.   
 
                                                          
16 Index calculation 100*[(X+M)-|X-M|] / (X+M), commonly referred to as a Grubel-Lloyd index; this 
index may capture both trade in differentiated final products (the traditional concept of intra-industry trade) 
as well as trade in intermediate inputs depending on the breadth of industry subgroups used in its 
construction.  See Campo and Goldberg data in Appendix Section 2 which show how intensively imports 
are represented in both U.S. consumption and production in 1995. 
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Table 4.1:  Intra-Industry Trade with the U.S. by Manufacturing Subsector
World Mexico O/(U) World China O/(U) World
Leather 19.0 81.4 62.4 1.3 (17.7)
Textiles 36.6 72.9 36.2 2.5 (34.1)
Furniture 38.7 43.6 4.9 1.8 (36.9)
Wood 38.9 91.5 52.6 6.7 (32.2)
Food, Beverage and Tobacco 46.5 50.6 4.1 2.8 (43.8)
Primary Metals 55.4 96.7 41.3 53.7 (1.7)
Motor Vehicles and Parts 57.3 58.9 1.6 34.5 (22.9)
Nonmetallic Minerals 57.7 69.8 12.2 11.2 (46.5)
Fabricated Metals 76.9 85.9 9.1 9.6 (67.3)
Computers and Electronics 77.3 62.7 (14.7) 20.0 (57.3)
Paper 82.6 42.4 (40.2) 69.3 (13.4)
Plastics 86.3 35.9 (50.4) 91.7 5.3
Chemicals 93.0 44.5 (48.5) 91.3 (1.7)
Machinery 96.4 94.1 (2.2) 69.0 (27.4)
Electrical Equipment/Appliances 98.3 95.0 (3.2) 34.9 (63.4)
O/(U) denotes country index Over/(Under) world value for that sector
Intra-Industry Trade Index by Sector - Average 1996-2005
 
 
There are some significant differences in the Intra-Industry Trade (IIT) indices 
across manufacturing industries based on the aggregate U.S. trade data in the first 
column.  Unfortunately, the aggregation of trade data across both developed and 
emerging market trading partners likely creates some blurring of the two forms of intra-
industry trade, with developed markets more likely to represent trade in differentiated 
final products, and emerging markets likely to include a larger share of imported 
intermediate inputs.  More directly relevant to this paper is how the indices for Mexico 
and China in any given sector compare to each other and to the world aggregate.   
Mexico has a significantly higher IIT index than the world aggregate in Leather, 
Textiles, Wood and Primary Metals, and slightly higher than the aggregate in four other 
categories.   
When comparing these data to the results for China, the differences are striking.  
China has a significantly lower IIT index versus the world aggregate in every industry 
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category except Plastics, and also has a higher index than Mexico in Chemicals and 
Paper.  Certainly, the geographical proximity of Mexico to the U.S. contributes to this 
result, while China imports components to its manufacturing facilities from its regional 
trading partners such as Hong Kong, as noted in Hsieh and Woo (1999).   
Incorporating these data into a time series model thus may help to identify 
whether Mexico's IIT performance in certain sectors is a contributing factor to stagnant 
wage growth, either in addition to or in place of an effect due to Chinese import 
penetration in the U.S. market.  Campa and Goldberg note for the developed markets in 
their paper that cross-industry trends in IIT do not seem to change much over time (i.e. 
those sectors that have high IIT at the start of the time series tend to remain high and 
vice-versa).  However, over the period under consideration in this paper there are some 
notable shifts in the relative position of Mexico versus both China and the world in some 
sectors, which may generate worthwhile time series estimates.  These historical data are 
shown for selected sectors in the Appendix Section 3. 
 
Section 4 – Data Sources and Characteristics 
Compensation data come from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 
International Labor Comparisons program, and cover hourly workers in manufacturing 
production.  Both local currency and U.S. dollar compensation measures are available. 
U.S. dollar costs were used for purposes of this analysis, with the perspective that 
international location decisions may be a key driver of cross-country wage pressures, and 
these decisions would be made by multi-nationals using a common global currency.  
Compensation includes both direct wage payments and other benefits, including holiday 
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pay, and payments for social security, health care or other social program contributions 
that may be made by employers in support of employees on their payroll.  The data for 
Mexico cover all types of manufacturing workers, and include both maquiladora and 
non-maquiladora production workers.17  Data are available by NAICS (North American 
Industry Classification System) codes from 1992-2005. 
Trade data come from the U.S. International Trade Statistics dataset published by 
the U.S. Census Bureau, which publishes data beginning in 1996 on trade with the U.S. 
by country for 1- 2- and 3- digit SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) 
codes.  The two classification systems were matched by the author, using a mapping 
shown in the Appendix Section 4.  For most manufacturing sub-sectors, the mapping was 
relatively clear between the two systems. 
 
                                                          
17 The differential treatment of maquiladora trade was significantly reduced upon implementation of 
NAFTA rules in 1994;  however, these types of production facilities remained a significant presence in 
Mexico's manufacturing environment through most of the period under study.  Maquiladora production is 
most concentrated in the automotive production, textiles and electronics sectors. 
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Food, Beverage and Tobacco 0.9                3.0               (2.1)                
Textiles 1.0                3.9               (2.9)                
Leather (0.1)               3.5               (3.6)                
Wood 1.0                4.2               (3.2)                
Paper (0.2)               2.5               (2.7)                
Chemicals 2.8                4.0               (1.2)                
Plastics 0.7                3.4               (2.7)                
Nonmetallic Minerals 2.1                3.4               (1.3)                
Primary Metals 1.6                2.4               (0.8)                
Fabricated Metals 1.7                2.2               (0.5)                
Motor Vehicles and Parts 2.0                3.7               (1.7)                
Computers and Electronics* 3.8                3.3               0.5                 
Electrical Equipment/Appliances 3.7                2.8               0.9                 
Furniture* 2.4                2.1               0.3                 
Machinery 2.4                3.3               (0.9)                
All Manufacturing 1.6                3.4               (1.8)                
* Country and dates covered are not consistent across all sub-sectors;
Furniture and Computers in particular have smaller country samples  
 
Table 4.2 summarizes the compensation cost data for Mexico and the rest of the 
33 countries in the BLS data set for these 15 sectors and the manufacturing aggregate.  
There are 3 sectors for which Mexico's compensation costs grew more quickly than the 
sample average, Computers and Electronics, Electrical Equipment and Appliances, and 
Furniture.  For all others, the shortfall in Mexican wage growth ranged from (0.5) to 
(3.6) percentage points.  This variation suggests that there are cross-industry dynamics 




Section 5 – Regression Framework 
The initial estimation seeks to identify the relationship between increased 
Chinese export penetration in the U.S. market and Mexican compensation for hourly 
manufacturing workers, and whether specific sub-sectors of manufacturing were 
disproportionately affected by Chinese trade. 
To explore this question, the basic estimation equation was constructed as 
follows: 
 
log(MexCompit) = β0 + β1i*log(ChinaUSTradeit/MexUSTradeit) + εit  (1) 
 
where MexComp is the hourly compensation for manufacturing workers by sector (i); 
ChinaUSTrade is the level of Chinese exports to the U.S. for each sector; MexUSTrade 
is the level of Mexican exports to the U.S. by sector; and εit is an error term, which will 
be corrected with cross-section and period fixed effects where appropriate for these panel 
data to ensure a well-behaved residual. 
The coefficient β1i would be negative and significant if the hypothesis holds that 
higher Chinese export penetration in the U.S. generates downward pressure on Mexican 
wages in sector i. 
A similar estimation is to be conducted to evaluate the relationship between intra-
industry trade and Mexican manufacturing wages.  In this case, the explanatory variable 
is the ratio of the IIT index for Mexico and the world trade with the U.S. in each sector, 
shown in equation (2). 
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log(MexCompit) = β0 + β1i*(MexUSIITit/WorldUSIITit) + εit   (2) 
 
 The ratio of Mexican to World IIT captures the extent to which each industry subsector 
in Mexico contains a larger portion of outsourced production than the same sector in 
other countries18.  As with the China trade variable, a negative coefficient would reflect a 
dampening effect on Mexican wage growth associated with higher intra-industry trade, a 
hypothesis consistent with Feenstra and Hansen's work on the impact of IIT on unskilled 
wages previously discussed in Section 3. 
After evaluating these results independently, a final regression (3) will explore 
the combined effect of these two explanatory variables to determine whether there are 
complementary or offsetting effects from Chinese trade penetration and IIT. 
 
log(MexCompit) = 
β0 + β1i*log(ChinaTradeit/MexTradeit) + β2i*(MexicoIITit/WorldIITit) + εit      (3) 
 
The possibility of augmenting this combined regression with an interaction term 
will be discussed in Section 7. 
 
Section 6 – Regression Results 
The first results come from the estimation of equation (1), testing the independent 
effect of Chinese trade penetration on Mexican manufacturing wages, and are shown in 
Table 4.3.  The impact of Chinese export penetration is insignificant for 5 of the 15 
sectors at the 10% confidence level.  For the remaining 10 sectors that demonstrated 
significant coefficients at the 10% level, 8 of them were significantly negative, 
                                                          
18 The regression was also estimated using the absolute level of the Mexican IIT index instead of this ratio, 
with similar results. 
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demonstrating the hypothesized relationship between increased penetration of Chinese 
exports in the U.S. market in these sectors and downward pressure on Mexican wages. 
 
Table 4.3: Single-Variable Estimation with Chinese Trade Penetration
Dependent Variable: log(MexComp)
Regression R-squared:   0.8099
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
Constant 0.740 28.62 0.00
Food, Beverage and Tobacco 0.092 2.41 0.02
Textiles -0.514 -4.72 0.00
Leather -0.103 -5.56 0.00
Wood -0.328 -7.87 0.00
Paper -0.190 -1.42 0.16
Chemicals 1.255 9.65 0.00
Plastics -0.072 -0.71 0.48
Nonmetallic Minerals 0.060 0.55 0.58
Primary Metals -0.341 -5.89 0.00
Fabricated Metals -0.160 -1.72 0.09
Motor Vehicles and Parts -0.112 -5.17 0.00
Computers and Electronics 0.017 0.14 0.89
Electrical Equipment/Appliances -0.127 -1.36 0.18
Furniture -0.386 -4.56 0.00
Machinery -0.247 -2.56 0.01











2005--C 0.314  
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The distribution of estimated sector impacts is shown in Table 4.4 relative to the 
level of compensation in each sector.  It is interesting to note that the sign and 
significance of the coefficients does not seem to be related to the absolute level of 
compensation in a sector.  The two sectors with positive and significant coefficients, 
Food and Beverages and Chemicals, sit at nearly opposite ends of the wage scale in 
Mexico.  And negative and significant coefficients are observed for both high- and low-
wage sectors, suggesting that the impact of Chinese import penetration on Mexican 
wages may not be unique to the low-wage, and presumably lower-skill, sectors of 
manufacturing. 
 
Table 4.4: 2005 Compensation per Hour and Coefficient from







Food, Beverage and Tobacco 2.15 0.092
Paper 2.42 -0.190
Plastics 2.43 -0.072
Fabricated Metals 2.44 -0.160
Nonmetallic Minerals 2.87 0.060
Computers and Electronics 2.88 0.017
Machinery 3.19 -0.247
Electrical Equipment/Appliances 3.19 -0.127
Motor Vehicles and Parts 3.52 -0.112
Primary Metals 3.86 -0.341
Chemicals 5.20 1.255
Manufacturing Avg. 2.64
Shaded coefficients were insigificant at the 10% level  
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The results of an estimation of equation (2), the independent effect of IIT on 
Mexican wages, are shown in Table 4.5.  
In this estimation, 13 of the 15 sectors demonstrate a significant coefficient at the 
10% level, with all but one of these sectors also significant at the 5% level.  However, 
the signs of the coefficients are mixed, with positive coefficients on 9 of the 13 
significant sectors.  These results provide limited support to the Feenstra and Hansen 
hypothesis.19 
 
                                                          
19 It may be noted that the sectors that demonstrate negative coefficients appear to be among the less-
skilled sectors, based on wage levels (these are the four lowest-wage sectors in Table 4).  This observation 
could be taken to support the hypothesis that IIT acts similarly to skill-biased technological change on 
unskilled wages. 
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Table 4.5:  Single-Variable Estimation with IIT Ratio
Dependent Variable: log(MexComp)
Regression R-squared:  0.97873
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 0.630 18.13 0.00
Food, Beverage and Tobacco -0.044 -1.36 0.18
Textiles -0.115 -6.05 0.00
Leather -0.050 -5.67 0.00
Wood -0.135 -9.64 0.00
Paper 0.190 2.55 0.01
Chemicals 1.701 21.13 0.00
Plastics 0.170 1.81 0.07
Nonmetallic Minerals 0.124 3.87 0.00
Primary Metals 0.267 11.96 0.00
Fabricated Metals 0.007 0.21 0.83
Motor Vehicles and Parts 0.398 10.57 0.00
Computers and Electronics 0.217 4.59 0.00
Electrical Equipment/Appliances 0.218 5.41 0.00
Furniture -0.205 -5.97 0.00
Machinery 0.266 6.68 0.00















Similar to the results for Chinese trade penetration related to compensation levels, 
the effect of the IIT variable does not appear on the surface to be related to the level of 
Mexican IIT by sector.  Table 4.6 shows the coefficients from Table 4.5 alongside the 
IIT index for Mexico, and the ratio of Mexico to world IIT.   
 








Plastics 35.9 0.4 0.170
Paper 42.4 0.5 0.190
Furniture 43.6 1.1 -0.205
Chemicals 44.5 0.5 1.701
Food, Beverage and Tobacco 50.6 1.1 -0.044
Motor Vehicles and Parts 58.9 1.0 0.398
Computers and Electronics 62.7 0.8 0.217
Nonmetallic Minerals 69.8 1.2 0.124
Textiles 72.9 2.0 -0.115
Leather 81.4 4.3 -0.050
Fabricated Metals 85.9 1.1 0.007
Wood 91.5 2.4 -0.135
Machinery 94.1 1.0 0.266
Electrical Equipment/Appliances 95.0 1.0 0.218
Primary Metals 96.7 1.7 0.267
Shaded coefficients were insignificant at the 10% level  
 
The absolute level of IIT for Mexico does not seem to be related to the sign of the 
coefficients in this estimation.  The four sectors with negative coefficients all have 
Mexico/World ratios greater than 1.  However, sectors with Mexico/World IIT ratios 
both above and below 1.0, and both low and high Mexican IIT index levels, demonstrate 
positive coefficients in this summary.  Another interesting observation is that Chemicals, 
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with a relatively low absolute IIT index level and low ratio of IIT to the rest of the world, 
has by far the highest coefficient. This is also the highest compensation sector in the data 
set.  With this exception, most of the positive coefficients are in a similar range of values. 
We might also expect that sectors representing the heaviest or largest goods 
would represent an advantage for Mexico in terms of IIT with the U.S. due to its 
geographical proximity and the relationship of that to shipping costs.  Yet in categories 
such as Machinery, Fabricated Metals and Motor Vehicles and Parts, Mexico has a 
similar IIT ratio relative to the rest of the world aggregate.  This result may be capturing 
some impact of trade in differentiated final products between the U.S. and other 
developed countries, as well as trade in smaller components of these products. 
The results of the combined estimation are shown in Table 4.7.  The inclusion of 
the IIT variable substantially changes the conclusions regarding the impact of Chinese 




Table 4.7:  Coefficients on Mexico Wages in Separate and Combined Regression Results
Regression R-squared:  0.9938
Separate Regressions Combined Regression
China Trade Relative IIT* China Trade Relative IIT*
Food, Beverage and Tobacco 0.0919 -0.0444 -0.0078 -0.0969
Textiles -0.5141 -0.1155 0.0972 -0.1611
Leather -0.1027 -0.0499 -0.0373 -0.0345
Wood -0.3276 -0.1353 0.4469 -0.3843
Paper -0.1901 0.1896 -0.4111 0.3612
Chemicals 1.2546 1.7007 0.0514 1.5589
Plastics -0.0724 0.1703 -0.1440 -0.0639
Nonmetallic Minerals 0.0599 0.1237 -0.0101 0.0867
Primary Metals -0.3409 0.2665 -0.0599 0.2053
Fabricated Metals -0.1599 0.0071 -0.0053 -0.0342
Motor Vehicles and Parts -0.1120 0.3981 -0.0527 0.2145
Computers and Electronics 0.0169 0.2169 0.0130 0.1531
Electrical Equipment/Appliances -0.1268 0.2179 0.1760 0.2677
Furniture -0.3862 -0.2054 -0.0056 -0.2475
Machinery -0.2474 0.2663 -0.0603 0.1811
*Relative IIT measured as ratio of Mexico IIT index to World Index with U.S. for each sector
Shaded coefficients were insignificant at the 10% level
Negative and signficant coefficients are shown in bold.  
 
The results of the combined regression are shown in the right two columns of the 
table.  The regression R-squared of 0.9938 passes an F test for an improvement in 
explanatory power at the 5% significance level as compared with either of the single-
variable estimations, though by a much greater margin against the China-only estimation.  
At the sector level, as compared with the results of the independent regression on China 
trade on the left, six sectors changed in significance (three in each direction) and two 
sectors with significant coefficients demonstrated a change in the sign of the coefficient 
from negative to positive once IIT impacts were accounted for (Textiles and Wood).  
These results suggest that, while the impact of China trade cannot be fully dismissed, it is 
important to take into account factors specific to Mexico's production chain before 
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arriving at any conclusion regarding China's impact.  Consistent with the F test results 
for the overall regression significance, the coefficients for IIT in the independent and 
combined regressions were relatively less sensitive to the inclusion of the Chinese trade 
variable.  Only two sectors, Food & Beverages and Plastics, changed sign or significance 
in the single-variable IIT regression versus the combined regression. 
On balance, the combined regression results do provide some insights into the 
factors limiting Mexico's wage growth.  Perhaps the most important conclusion is that, 
when differences across sectors are accounted for, there is no single explanation for the 
stagnation in Mexican manufacturing wages.  On net the results in Table 4.7 offer at least 
a partial explanation, with a source of negative impact on wages identified for 9 of the 15 
sectors studied, as summarized in Table 4.8. 
 
Table 4.8:





Motor Vehicles and Parts
Sectors with negative wage impact from High IIT Relative to World









Other recent studies have explored similar questions with regard to competition 
between Mexican and Chinese exports, both at the sector level, as in this paper, and at 
the product level.  Most have focused on the relationship between Chinese and Mexican 
exports, not wages.  However, the results are similar in terms of the observation of 
substantial variation in the effect of Chinese competition on Mexico across export 
industries and products. 
Feenstra and Lee (2007) look at export variety for China and Mexico across 
seven aggregated industry sectors, and find that China has narrowed the export variety 
gap with Mexico in four of the seven sectors.  A summary of these data are shown in the 
Appendix Section 5.  Although their industry categorization is slightly broader than the 
sectors studied in this paper, three of the seven sectors in their analysis (Paper & Plastics, 
Wood & Paper, and Machinery & Transport) encompass three of the five sectors 
observed to have a negative impact from Chinese trade penetration in Table 4.8 (Paper, 
Plastics, and Motor Vehicles & Parts).  In the aggregate, their analysis finds that 
increased Chinese export variety to the U.S. is associated with a reduction in Mexican 
export variety.20  They also conclude that increased Mexican export variety is not 
associated with a significant reduction in Chinese export variety to the U.S. 
 Gallagher and Moreno-Brid (2008) look at the dynamism of Mexican versus 
Chinese exports, as represented by a dynamic revealed competiveness metric which is 
the change in the share of U.S. imports represented by Mexican exports and by Chinese 
exports in a given sector.  Sectors in which Mexico is increasing its share of U.S. imports 
are said to demonstrate dynamic competitiveness.  If Mexico's share is falling and 
                                                          
20 Export variety is shown in several studies to be associated with higher productivity and GDP growth for 
the exporting country.  See Funke and Ruhwedel (2001), Feenstra and Kee (2006), and Broda and 
Weinstein (2006). 
120 
China's is rising, that sector is said to be under a direct competitive threat from China.  A 
partial threat is identified if both countries' shares are rising, but China's is rising faster.  
In the aggregate, Gallagher and Moreno-Brid  find that 53% of Mexican exports were 
under partial or direct threat from Chinese competition during 2000-2005, up from 
41.8% in 1997-2000.  These changes are calculated at the product level, so it is difficult 
to make a direct comparison to the sector results in this study.  For example, the 
Electrical Components category has one product each on the top 15 most and least 
dynamic exports list for Mexico.  However, their results demonstrate again the micro-
level differences in Chinese competitive pressure on Mexican exports. 
 
Section 7 – Interaction Term 
An additional question to be considered is whether the relationship between 
China trade and Mexican wages varies depending on the value of the intra-industry trade 
index, and conversely for IIT with regard to China trade.  It might be hypothesized, for 
example, that a high IIT index for Mexico with the U.S. in a given sector could dampen 
the impact of Chinese trade penetration on wages by locking in trade relationships along 
the production chain, thus shielding the sector from Chinese competition.  This would 
generate a positive coefficient on the interaction term.   
To address this question, equation (3) was augmented with a simple 
multiplicative interaction term as shown in equation (4): 
 
log(MexCompit) = 
β0 + β1i*log(ChinaUSTradeit/MexUSTradeit) + β2i*(MexicoUSIITit/WorldUSIITit) + 
β3i*[ log(ChinaTradeit/MexTradeit)*(MexicoIITit/WorldIITit)] + εit                   (4) 
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As a result, the interpretation of the coefficients on the other variables changes, 
so that β1 now captures the full effect of China trade on Mexican wages only when the 
value of the IIT index equals its mean.21  Thus, the total effect of China trade on Mexican 
wages now is calculated as: 




= ,...1         (5) 
 
where β1 is the coefficient on China trade, β3 is the coefficient on the interaction term 
and IITit is the value of the Mexico/World IIT ratio for sector i at time t.  Similarly, the 
total effect of intra-industry trade on Mexican wages is: 
 




= ,...1          (6) 
 
An estimation of equation 3 with a common (i.e. pooled time series/cross section) 
estimation of the interaction term generated a coefficient β3 that was positive and 
significant at the 1% level.  The high degree of significance of this coefficient in the 
pooled data offers some confidence in applying the common coefficient across all 
industry subsectors, in contrast to the results for the individual variables which were not 
significant on a pooled basis (as shown in the Appendix).  The result of applying the 
calculations in (4) and (5) to the regression outcome is shown in Table 4.9. 
 
                                                          
21 This interpretation is based on the centering of the IIT variable, i.e. taking the deviation from its mean as 
the dependent variable in calculating the interaction term.  For China trade, the mean of the data values 
was very close to zero, and so this variable was not centered.  The interpretation for this variable, then, is 
that the impact of IIT equals β2 only when log(China trade) equals zero. 
122 
Table 4.9:  Coefficients from Combined Regression with Interaction Term
China Trade IIT Interaction Total China Trade Total IIT
Food, Beverage and Tobacco 0.014 -0.063 0.024 0.041 -0.049
Textiles 0.076 -0.185 0.024 0.125 -0.192
Leather -0.054 -0.110 0.024 0.051 -0.146
Wood 0.400 -0.412 0.024 0.458 -0.429
Paper -0.354 0.251 0.024 -0.342 0.246
Chemicals 0.080 1.453 0.024 0.092 1.448
Plastics -0.121 -0.122 0.024 -0.110 -0.121
Nonmetallic Minerals 0.037 0.025 0.024 0.066 0.018
Primary Metals -0.066 0.205 0.024 -0.023 0.212
Fabricated Metals 0.050 -0.108 0.024 0.078 -0.115
Motor Vehicles and Parts -0.048 0.257 0.024 -0.023 0.283
Computers and Electronics 0.031 0.105 0.024 0.051 0.102
Electrical Equipment/Appliances 0.201 0.259 0.024 0.225 0.263
Furniture -0.002 -0.293 0.024 0.025 -0.301
Machinery -0.022 0.180 0.024 0.002 0.184
Shaded coefficients were insignificant at the 10% level
Negative and significant coefficients are shown in bold
Pure Effect plus Interaction Effect =
 
 
Using the combined regression including this interaction term does not 
substantially change the results by sector as compared to the summary in Table 4.8.  Four 
of the five sectors demonstrating a negative relationship between Chinese trade 
penetration and wages still do so when adding the interaction effect, but Leather 
manufacturing changes to a positive relationship.  For IIT, the same five sectors still 
demonstrate a negative relationship between intra-industry trade and Mexican wages, 
and Fabricated Metals is added as a sixth sector with a significantly negative coefficient.  
The R-squared of the combined regression with the interaction term is 0.9942, versus 
0.9938 in the combined regression without the interaction term.  An F statistic for the 
significance of the difference between these two R-squared values is calculated at 10.069 
which does not pass a significance test at the 10% level, and indicates that the addition of 
the interaction term does not add statistically significant explanatory power to the model.  
We may therefore be roughly indifferent between the results of the combined model with 
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and without the interaction term.  Despite the loss of one degree of freedom in the 
interaction model, the high degree of significance on the pooled cross-section time series 
coefficient on the interaction term does point to a relevant relationship between the 
explanatory variables.  Nonetheless, it is worth reiterating that the broad conclusions by 
sector changed little between the two cases. 
 
Section 8 – Evaluating the Direction of Causation 
The results presented so far in this chapter capture a relationship between 
Chinese import penetration and Mexican wage growth, but do not demonstrate 
causation.  In fact, it is possible to construct a plausible argument that causation 
between Chinese import penetration and Mexican wage growth runs in either direction.  
While Chinese competition may exert downward pressure on Mexican wages, as 
described previously in this paper and elsewhere, it could also be the case that low 
Mexican wages in some sectors serve as a buffer against Chinese competition in the U.S. 
market. 
In the context of the estimation structure in this paper, the counter-argument has 
the benefit of producing an opposite sign to the initial hypothesis; that is, if lower 
Mexican wages acted as a buffer to Chinese competition, a positive relationship would 
be observed between the two variables.  In fact, three sectors in the combined 
regression did demonstrate a positive and significant relationship.  Lending further 
support to the alternative hypothesis, two of those sectors, wood and textiles, are the 
lowest-wage sectors in the study as shown in Table 4.4.  This potential two-way 
causation between Mexican wages and Chinese import penetration may also explain 
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why the sign on Chinese trade in the pooled regression results is so far from being 
significant, with or without the inclusion of the interaction term.  However, it also 
represents an endogeneity problem for the estimation. 
One possible alternative is to introduce an instrumental variable for Chinese 
export competitiveness that would not be affected by lower Mexican wages.  Chinese 
exports to Europe may be considered as an instrumental variable meeting that criterion.  
To test this, the regression was estimated on the pooled data using European imports 
from China, as a share of total European imports, as the instrumental variable.  The data 
were gathered from Eurostat.  The results are shown alongside the other pooled 
estimation results in the Appendix. 
This regression generates a coefficient on Chinese trade that remains far from 
significance, very similar to the non-IV regression on the pooled sample.  The result for 
the IIT variable still is negative and significant in the pooled IV regression.  This 
outcome may indicate that the European trade variable is not a perfect instrument for 
the impact of Chinese competitiveness.  It is also possible that the sector-specific effects 
are being masked in the pooled estimation.  To explore this question further, the single-
variable Chinese trade equation (1) was estimated again using the IV estimator.  The 
results are shown in Table 4.10.   
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Table 4.10:  Single-Variable Estimation with IV for Chinese Competition Effect
Dependent Variable: log(MexComp)
Instrumental Variable:  log(Chinese_EU_Imports/Total_EU_Imports)
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 0.897 6.65 0.00
Food, Beverage and Tobacco 0.204 1.73 0.09
Textiles -1.385 -2.77 0.01
Leather -0.153 -2.69 0.01
Wood -0.539 -3.53 0.00
Paper -0.529 -0.80 0.43
Chemicals 1.472 3.14 0.00
Plastics 0.470 1.04 0.30
Nonmetallic Minerals -0.235 -0.64 0.52
Primary Metals -0.206 -1.11 0.27
Fabricated Metals -0.507 -1.42 0.16
Motor Vehicles and Parts -0.054 -0.82 0.41
Computers and Electronics 1.992 3.25 0.00
Electrical Equipment/Appliances 0.106 0.36 0.72
Furniture -1.232 -2.66 0.01
Machinery 0.009 0.03 0.98
Shaded coefficients were insignificant at the 10% level
Significant and negative coefficients in bold  
 
This estimation generated seven significant sector coefficients, including four 
negative and three positive results.  The persistence of both positive and negative sector 
coefficients suggests that the European trade IV is not sufficiently controlling for the 
endogeneity issue between Chinese import penetration and Mexican wages. 
Taken together, the results in this section suggest that some sectors of Mexican 
industry may experience a negative relationship between Chinese trade and wages, but 
these results are far from robust.  A longer time series of sector-specific data would help 
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to address these questions more rigorously, as would the identification of additional 
instrumental variables for the effect of increased Chinese competition. 
 
Section 9 – Conclusions and Areas for Further Research 
If macroeconomic growth rates are one key determinant of labor cost growth, as 
studied in Chapters 2 and 3, then looking at industry-level factors as in this chapter may 
provide additional explanatory power, especially in the presence of endogeneity or 
omitted variables that can be an issue with broader macroeconomic studies (Hallak and 
Levinsohn 2003).  In the case of Mexico, this chapter demonstrates that there are 
substantial differences in wage and export performance at a disaggregated level within 
the manufacturing sector.  Looking at the data on this basis generates different 
conclusions regarding the influence of competition from China, and the impact of intra-
industry trade on unskilled wages, than would be observed in the aggregate.  However, 
as discussed in the previous section, even the disaggregated data may suffer from 
endogeneity issues.  While this paper finds evidence of a negative impact on Mexican 
wages due to Chinese trade competition, that result is not universal across sectors of 
manufacturing.  Similarly for intra-industry trade, wages in eight of the fifteen sectors 
studied appear to benefit from expanded IIT, although another five sectors were found to 
have a significantly negative relationship. 
The methodology used in this chapter offers a potential avenue for research on 
other cross-country comparisons.  The industry-level wage data within manufacturing are 
available for 34 countries in the International Labor Comparisons program, and the 
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import and export data by SITC code used in this paper can be compiled for any country 















































Sri Lanka 0.54 1 0.28 1
Philippines 1.07 2 N/A 4
Mexico 2.75 3 1.46 10
Brazil 4.91 4 N/A 12
Poland 4.99 5 N/A 7
Hong Kong SAR 5.78 6 0.75 5
Hungary 6.29 7 N/A 9
Taiwan 6.43 8 0.38 3
Czech Republic 6.77 9 N/A 8
Portugal 7.65 10 1.53 11
Singapore 8.55 11 0.84 6
Israel 12.98 12 2.02 14
New Zealand 14.47 13 3.27 17
Korea, Republic of 14.72 14 0.32 2
Greece 16.1 15 1.69 13
Spain 18.83 16 2.52 15
Japan 20.2 17 2.97 16
United States 23.82 18 6.16 28
France 24.9 19 4.49 20
Italy 25.07 20 4.64 22
Canada 25.74 21 6.11 27
Ireland 25.96 22 3.51 19
Australia 26.14 23 5.6 24
United Kingdom 27.1 24 3.35 18
Luxembourg 27.74 25 6.21 29
Finland 29.9 26 5.06 23
Austria 30.46 27 4.5 21
Switzerland 30.67 28 6.03 26
Sweden 31.8 29 7.12 33
Belgium 31.85 30 5.76 25
Netherlands 32.34 31 6.58 31
Denmark 35.45 32 6.23 30
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































IIT Indices for Mexico, China and World by Sector 

















































































Mapping from NAICS to SITC Codes 
Sector Title Eviews Variable Name Tag NAICS Code SITC Code
food, bev and tobacco mfg _food 311-312 00-12, 22
textiles and textile products mfg _text 313-315 65, 84
leather and allied products mfg _leath 316 61, 83, 85
wood product mfg _wood 321 63
paper manufacturing _paper 322 64
chemical manufacturing _chem 325 51-56, 59
plastics and rubber mfg _plast 326 57-58, 62
nonmetallic minerals mfg _miner 327 66
primary metal mfg _primmet 331 67-68
fabricated metal mfg _fabmet 332 69
motor vehicles and parts _veh 3361-3363 78
transportation equipment _transp 336 78-79
computer and electronic product mfg _compu 334 75-76, 87
electrical equip and appliance mfg _electric 335 77
furniture and related product mfg _furn 337 82
machinery mfg _machine 333 71-74, 88  
 
 
Mexican and Chinese Export Variety 
  












1990 52.4 41.5 71.2 47.3 55.4 46.6 65.6 39.5
2001 66.7 50.9 82.6 63.2 72.7 56.4 75.8 65.6
Growth rate 2.2 1.9 1.4 2.6 2.5 1.7 1.3 4.6












1990 42.1 29.6 79.4 52.2 39.2 31.1 28.1 35.2
2001 63.3 34.0 87.6 65.2 70.3 55.1 62.7 68.1
Growth rate 3.7 1.3 0.9 2.0 5.3 5.2 7.3 6.0
Export Variety measured as % of U.S. import varieties covered by Mexican/Chinese exports




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Aitken, Brian and Ann Harrison and Robert E. Lipsey (1997).  "Wages and Foreign 
Ownership: A Comparative Study of Mexico, Venezuela and the United States," NBER 
Working Papers 5102, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Broda, Christine and David Weinstein (2006).  "Globalization and the Gains from 
Variety," Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
 
Brown, Drusilla K., Alan V. Deardorff, and Robert M. Stern (2004). "The Effects of 
Multinational Production on Wages and Working Conditions in Developing Countries," 
August 30, 2002; in Robert E. Baldwin and L. Alan Winters, eds., Challenges to 
Globalization: Analyzing the Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Campa, Jose and Linda S. Goldberg (1997).  "The Evolving External Orientation of 
Manufacturing Industries: Evidence from Four Countries," NBER Working Paper 5919, 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Feenstra, Robert C. and Gordon H. Hansen (1996).  "Globalization, Outsourcing, and 
Wage Inequality," NBER Working Paper 5424, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Feenstra, Robert C. and Gordon H. Hansen (2001). "Global Production Sharing and 
Rising Inequality:  A Survey of Trade and Wages," NBER Working Paper 8372, 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Feenstra, Robert C. and Hiau Looi Kee (2007).  "Trade Liberalization and Export 
Variety:  A Comparison of Mexico and China," The World Economy. 
 
Feenstra, Robert C. and H.L. Kee (2006).  "Export Variety and Country Productivity:  
Estimating the Monopolistic Competition Model with Endogenous Productivity," World 
Bank Policy Research Group and University of California, Davis. 
 
Funke, Michael and Ralf Ruhwedel (2001).  "Product Variety and Economic Growth:  
Empirical Evidence from the OECD Countries," IMF Staff Papers. 
 
Gallagher, Kevin P. and Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid (2008).  "The Dynamism of Mexican 
Imports: Lost in (Chinese) Translation?" World Development. 
 
Gruben, William C. (2001).  "Was NAFTA behind Mexico's High Maquiladora 
Growth?" Economic and Financial Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. 
 
Hallak, Juan Carlos and James Levinsohn (2004).  "Fooling Ourselves: Evaluating the 




Hansen, Gordon H. (2003).  "What Has Happened to Wages in Mexico Since NAFTA? 
Implications for Hemispheric Free Trade", NBER Working Papers 9563, National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Hansen, Gordon H. and Ann E. Harrison (1999).  "Trade, Technology and Wage 
Inequality in Mexico," Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 
 
Hsieh, Chang-Tai and Keong T. Woo (1999). "The Impact of Outsourcing to China on 
Hong Kong's Labor Market," mimeo, Princeton University, cited in Feenstra and Hansen 
(2001). 
 
Lall, Sanjaya and John Weiss (2005).  "The Competitive Threat Posed by the People's 
Republic of China to Latin America: An Analysis for 1990-2002", ADB Institute 
Research Paper Series No. 65, Asian Development Bank. 
 
Long, Guoqiang (2005).  "China's Policies on FDI," in Does Foreign Direct Investment 
Promote Development? Moran, Graham and Blomstrom eds. Institute for International 
Economics. 
 
OECD Economic Outlook 71 (2002). "Intra-industry and Intra-firm Trade and the 
Internationalization of Production," Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. 
 
Palma, Jose Gabriel (2005).  "The Seven Main Stylized Facts of the Mexican Economy 
Since Trade Liberalization and NAFTA", Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Polaski, Sandra (2004). "Mexican Employment, Productivity and Income a Decade After 
NAFTA", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Brief Submitted to the Canadian 
















Convergence in compensation costs is an important issue in the economic 
literature from a theoretical and an applied perspective.  Central theories of 
macroeconomics and international trade point toward convergence in wages, which can 
be tested by looking for evidence of convergence in cross-country data.  Economic 
agents have a substantial interest in whether these theories hold true in practice, 
including multinational corporations seeking low-cost locations for global manufacturing 
operations. 
Chapter 2 demonstrated that the definition of convergence itself is open to debate.  
However, using the method proposed by Philips and Sul, there is evidence of 
convergence in compensation costs within three groups of countries. 
The regression results from Chapter 3 provide support for a multiple-cone 
Heckscher-Ohlin view of global compensation data. 
When considering country-specific factors, a different set of issues emerges.  
Data on Mexican versus Chinese import penetration and the extent of Mexico's intra-
industry trade with the U.S. both have been cited as potential factors dampening Mexican 
compensation growth over the past decade.  The results show that each of these factors 
has a negative relationship to Mexican wage growth for some manufacturing subsectors, 
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but neither variable provides a universal explanation for weak Mexican compensation 
growth. 
These papers provide some evidence for convergence in global compensation 
costs, particularly among countries producing a similar mix of goods due to their 
resource endowments.  However, there is little evidence that the compensation cost gap 
between the highest and lowest cost countries will be closed over the foreseeable future.  
Based on the calculations in Chapter 2, it could take at least half a century before the 
lower-wage markets in the sample overtake the high-wage markets, even under the 
relatively generous assumption that the current rate of growth in the low-wage markets is 
sustained over that entire period. 
 
